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ABSTRACT
While conflict has always existed between the 
president and the Congress over war-making roles, the 
president's Commander-in-Chief role has expanded 
significantly since World War II. This study examines
expansion of presidential power in terms of the 
establishment of the United States as a world economic and 
political power and the development of nuclear weapons.
Case studies were selected from each of the 
administrations from Truman through Reagan to illustrate 
these points. The Truman administration is studied in 
terms of the war in Korea and the advent of the limited war 
concept in a nuclear-powered world.
President Eisenhower's massive retaliation strategy 
represents the first real national military strategy. It 
set the stage for an unprecedented standing force of 
nuclear weapons as the U.S. moved to the center stage of 
world power.
The Kennedy administration's handling of the Cuban 
Missile Crisis outlines the problems of massive retaliation 
strategy as other nations continued to develop their own 
forces. It also points out the need for a sole decision 
maker in crisis situations and changes in the concept of 
imminent danger.
The Gulf of Tonkin Resolution in 1964 granted the 
broadest possible powers to President Johnson as he
vi
pursued American interests in Vietnam. The resolution led 
to the largest presidentially made war in American history.
President Nixon's decision to bomb and invade Cambodia 
in 1970 was an extension of the Tonkin Gulf Resolution. 
This decision served as the final straw for Congress in 
terms of presidential power and resulted in the War Powers 
Act of 1973.
The Ford Administration's handling of the Mavaguez 
seizure in 1975 and President Carter's approach to the Iran 
hostage crisis in 1979 illustrate the presidency in the 
post-War Powers Act environment. Both men gave lip service 
to the law, but basically continued to act as presidents 
before them had done.
President Reagan's leadership in invading Grenada in 
1983 finally illustrates the use of strong presidential 
power, yet recognizes the role of Congress in war-making by 
complying with the provisions of the War Powers Act.
This thesis concludes that presidential war powers 
expanded to an all time high by 1973, and then levelled 
off. Much of the time since then has been spent seeking 
the correct balance between the president and Congress 
based on the provisions of the War Powers Act.
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CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION
Article II, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution states, 
"The President shall be Commander-in-Chief of the Army and 
Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the 
several States, when called into the actual Service of the 
United States..." At the same time, Article I, Section 8 
grants various powers to the Congress including "To declare 
War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules 
concerning Captures on Land and Water; To raise and support 
Armies, but no Appropriation of Money to that Use shall be 
for a longer Term than two Years; To provide and maintain a 
Navy; To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of 
the land and naval Forces; To provide for calling forth the 
Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress 
Insurrections and repel Invasions; To provide for 
organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia, and for 
governing such Part of them as may be employed in the 
Service of the United States, reserving to the States 
respectively, the Appointment of the Officers, and the 
Authority of training the Militia according to the 
discipline prescribed by Congress..."
Clearly the framers of the Constitution meant for the 
executive and the legislature to share war powers in order 
to fight only "just wars" and limit the possibilities of 
personal military excursions conducted so frequently at 
that time by the monarchs of Europe. The actual text of
1
2
the Constitution thus becomes one influence on the division 
of authority between the president and Congress. Other 
issues also have an impact, however. Among them are the 
real intentions of those attending the constitutional 
convention, evolving beliefs, and actual practice since 
1789.(1)
The basic trend over the last two hundred years has
been one of presidential aggrandizement of war powers.
This trend seems to run contrary to the intentions of the
framers, and thus must be more a result of other
influences. According to Reveley:
The weight of the evidence at Philadelphia does 
suggest that a majority of the Framers by September wished an Executive who would be more than an 
agent of Congress. But to conclude from that 
purpose that the Framers, without saying so, also 
intended to clothe the President with an indeterminate 
reservoir of foreign and military authority via the executive-power clause is difficult, given 
the Framers' caution concerning executive power 
and their expressed desire to limit it.(2)
Other legal scholars conclude that the Framers intended for
the president to conduct war only after Congress made the
decision to initiate it. This conclusion comes from
convention debate over the wording of Article I.
Originally, Congress was to be granted the power to "make
war," but after arguments by Madison concerning the need to
"repel sudden attacks" the phrase was changed to read "To
declare war."(3) Clearly, historical events have moved the
intentions of the framers to an academic position as the
commander-in-chief powers of the president have continued
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to expand. Occasional debates surface in political 
rhetoric and academic study, but the intentions of the 
framers today hold little weight in determining 
presidential war powers.
It did not take long for different beliefs to evolve 
concerning presidential war powers. During the 
ratification debate, Alexander Hamilton authored Federalist 
#69 where he described the commander-in-chief clause as 
"nothing more than the supreme command and direction of the 
military and naval forces, as first general and admiral of 
the Confederacy." He strongly implied that the president 
could only fight a war once committed to that war by 
Congress. About the same time, James Madison wrote to 
Thomas Jefferson, "The Constitution supposes what the 
History of all Governments demonstrates that the Executive 
is the branch of power most interested in war and most 
prone to it. It has accordingly with studied care vested 
the question in the Legislature."(4) However, shortly 
after ratification of the Constitution by the states, 
Hamilton seemed to allow for a bit more war-making power by 
the president.
It is the peculiar and exclusive province of 
Congress, when the nation is at peace to change 
that state into a state of war; whether from 
calculations of policy, or from provocations, 
or injuries received: in other words, it belongs 
to Congress only, to go to War. But when a foreign 
nation declares, or openly and avowedly makes 
war upon the United States, they are then by the 
very fact already at war, and any declaration on 
the part of Congress is nugatory; it is at least
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unnecessary.(5)
Hamilton's statement illustrates some of the problems with
the text of the Constitution and transcripts of the
convention concerning war powers. There seems to be a
problem of how the war powers are shared between the
president and the Congress. Different circumstances can
determine how and when a nation is at war. These different
situations require a clearly discernable outline of powers
indicating who does what. The Constitution is weak on this
point. Really, all references to war powers of the
president and Congress in the Constitution concern a time
that the United States is prepared to initiate and conduct
a war to secure its own clearly supported interests.
Thomas points out the problem with this vagueness.
The language of the Constitution is ambiguous. Nor 
does the intent of the framers emerge from their 
debates with the clarity which might be desired. 
Perhaps the language of the constitutional debates 
would indicate that a larger portion of the war 
power was to be placed in the Congress, and insofar as the United States is concerned that body through 
its power to declare war would be empowered to 
initiate war. The President would be left free to 
repel sudden attacks. But what is meant by sudden 
attacks? Moreover, no clear-cut answer is to be 
found to the question of the President's power to 
use force short of war.(6)
What exactly is meant by sudden attacks? Does the
president have to wait until the nation comes under attack
to have the power to use military forces in self-defense?
Or, if intelligence sources indicate the probability of
imminent attack, can the president act in a pre-emptive way
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to defeat the attacker? Good military doctrine supports 
the concept of pre-emptive strikes and international law 
allows pre-emptive action to protect a nation's 
sovereignty, but the Constitution is unclear about who has 
the power to initiate such action.
To expand the question, do American people and 
equipment outside the borders of the United States fall 
under the same type of protection from "sudden attacks?" 
Obviously, the framers were not able to forecast advances 
in transportation and communication which make these 
questions so much more complicated. They also never appear 
to have considered the use of military force for anything 
short of full scale war.
Considering these weaknesses, evolving beliefs and 
historical precedents will actually do a better job of 
describing and explaining presidential war powers. As 
stated earlier, the historical trend has been to increase 
the powers of the president as commander-in-chief. First, 
the constitutional basis of presidential war powers evolved 
from delegated to inherent powers of the president as 
commander-in-chief. Next, the role evolved from a simple 
military commander to a vast reservoir of indeterminate 
powers in times of emergencies. Finally, history provides 
examples of sweeping legislative powers claimed by Congress 
being delegated to the president to the extent needed to 
carry out commander-in-chief duties.(7) Presidential war
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powers have expanded steadily since ratification of the 
Constitution. With the possible exception of the Civil 
War, the most visible expansion of presidential war powers 
has occurred since World War II. It is probable that this 
most recent expansion of power has resulted from changing 
circumstances affecting the presidency. These changes 
include rapidly advancing technology and extensive treaty 
commitments positioning the United States as a world 
leader.
This study attempts to explain the expansion of 
presidential power as commander-in-chief since World War II 
in terms of two developments: a new U.S. position as a 
world leader in economics and politics, and the development 
of nuclear weapons. At the end of World War II, the United 
States emerged as the pre-eminent economic power in the 
world. While the nations who had their territory used as a 
battlefield struggled to rebuild, Americans enjoyed 
unprecedented wealth. Appropriately, the United States was 
thrust into a leadership role in rebuilding the world 
economy.
Similarly, the United States and the Soviet Union 
emerged as the world's political powers. Cold War 
pressures and world needs for economic development led to 
extensive treaty commitments with the American president in 
a clear leadership role.
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Lastly, technological developments had made the world 
a smaller place. More advanced communications and 
information systems and weapons of mass destruction made 
the need for quick decision making with respect to war 
making much more critical.
Since this expansion is so difficult to quantify in 
terms of some number and the constitutional aspects of the 
question are so vague, I plan to present case studies from 
each administration from Harry Truman to Ronald Reagan to 
support my claim of expanded presidential war powers 
since World War II. This method assumes that evolving 
beliefs about war powers and real actions of various 
presidents explain the expansion of the commander-in-chief 
role.
Case studies have the obvious disadvantage of 
difficulty in generalizing their conclusions to the "big 
picture." However, they are useful with issues like this 
for several reasons. First, and probably most important, 
case studies provide an appreciation for real time 
constraints on researchers and decision makers. For 
instance, this study will cover one particular case under 
each president since World War II. To study fully the 
president as commander-in-chief during this period alone 
would be a very large project. One source claims that 
between 1945 and 1975 (two administrations fewer than 
are dealt with here), the United States was involved in 215
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military incidents, police actions, or shows of force, 
including two threats of nuclear action.(8)
A second advantage of case studies stems from the 
constitutional side of this issue. Policy questions like 
presidential war powers are often ill-defined. Because 
no one has been able to clearly write down what the policy 
is, case studies tend to clarify what is really going on.
Before turning to the cases since World War II, 
it is important to gain an understanding of the historical 
context of presidential war powers in order to see how 
significant the more recent changes have been. Throughout 
history, a variety of matters have been addressed by 
presidents acting as commander-in-chief without explicit 
Congressional approval.(9) In terms of military action, 
there have been short term deployments, long term 
stationing of troops on foreign soil, training and advising 
of foreign forces, providing armament or naval protection 
to merchant vessels, airlifting supplies over hostile or 
disputed territory, searches and seizures of foreign 
vessels or aircraft, naval blockades, covert intelligence 
operations, threats and assurances of U.S. military action, 
and actual combat operations.
Associated nonmilitary actions include concern over 
the treatment of Americans abroad and the giving and 
receiving of official apologies. Presidents have stated 
foreign economic claims and terms concerning foreign
9
officials and troops, as well as conducted foreign 
political operations. They have participated in summits, 
conferences and international organizations, recognized 
governments, and made threats and assurances of U.S. 
non-military action, all without the expressed approval of 
Congress. These actions have all been justified under the 
commander-in-chief powers of the president.
The traditions and precedents of the 
commander-in-chief powers have developed most during times 
of war, but significant precedents have been set outside of 
war. In 1807, Thomas Jefferson, one of the framers most 
distrusting of a strong independent executive, acted in the 
first real way to expand the powers of the president as 
commander-in-chief.(10) After Congress had recessed for 
the year, the British navy fired on the American vessel 
Chesapeake. Without calling Congress back into session or 
even consulting with Congressional leaders, Jefferson 
ordered emergency military supplies sent to help. In 
justifying his action, Jefferson stated that observance of 
the written law was important, but not as important as 
self-preservation and national security.
James Madison was president during the War of 1812. 
Madison preferred to delegate his military authority to 
subordinate commanders and the cabinet. He had no military 
experience himself, and had more special interest in the 
legal and political workings of government.(11) Despite
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this lack of interest in military affairs, Madison did take 
an active role in war planning. He concerned himself with 
naval superiority on the Great Lakes, defense of the city 
of Washington, and the dispatch of Andrew Jackson to New 
Orleans to protect the mouth of the Mississippi.
Madison's Secretary of War, John Armstrong took 
advantage of the president's "hands off" approach to seek 
his own political fortune. He routinely began to disregard 
instructions from the president. When Madison discovered 
this, he became much more involved as commander-in-chief.
He reminded Armstrong that he was under the supervision of 
and subject to the orders of the president and ordered him 
to clear all further instructions concerning military 
operations through him. Madison even briefly exercised 
direct command over O.S. forces during the British attack 
on Washington.
In 1846, President Polk acted to vastly expand his 
power as commander-in-chief. Polk ordered General Zachary 
Taylor to take troops into disputed territory between the 
Neuces and Rio Grande Rivers.(12) Mexico attacked Taylor's 
army on the grounds that American forces had invaded 
Mexican territory. Polk then went to Congress asking for 
and receiving a declaration of war on May 11, 1846.(13)
After the war declaration, Polk took an active part in 
commanding military operations. With the help of the 
cabinet, Polk already had a grand strategy mapped out when
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war was declared.(14) He issued orders to Taylor directing 
advances into northern Mexico, to Kearney taking 
California, and formulated plans for an invasion from the 
Gulf coast near Mexico City. Polk also directed the 
administrative details of the military action. He was 
concerned with matters such as sailing dates for navy 
ships, purchases of army pack animals, and processing of 
every officer's commission.
Perhaps the largest expansion of presidential power as 
commander-in-chief in the history of the United States came 
during the Civil War. Abraham Lincoln continued the 
tradition started by Jefferson that self-preservation of 
the nation was more important than adherence to written 
law. In fact, Robinson claims that Lincoln proved the 
ability of the president to become a dictator using the 
commander-in-chief clause in times of national 
emergency.(15)
Despite a constitutional requirement for Congress to 
authorize increases in the size of military forces, Lincoln 
ordered such increases in the army and navy without 
Congressional authorization. He single-handedly suspended 
the writ of habeas corpus, ordered civilians in front line 
areas tried in military courts, nationalized the railroads 
and wire systems under the War Department, and issued the 
Emancipation Proclamation, freeing all slaves.(16) In 
addition, Lincoln ordered a naval blockade of the
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Confederacy without consulting Congress. This 1863 
blockade was upheld as an appropriate exercise of 
commander-in-chief powers by the Supreme Court.(17)
President Lincoln did not stop there. He also became 
the first president to exercise direct control of armies in 
the field outside the immediate area of Washington. Klotz 
explains that several different factors account for this 
active involvement.(18) First, the Civil War was the first 
American war where information about troop movements and 
results of battles could be learned in a matter of hours, 
rather than days or weeks. War Department controlled 
telegraph lines rapidly relayed information to Washington 
where the president could act on near real-time 
information.
The Navy and War Departments' failure to develop a 
strategic command and control system prior to 1861 also led 
to active presidential involvement in operations. In the 
army, planning and command responsibility rested with the 
commanding general officer. Lincoln had many difficulties 
with this system, finding it difficult to find a general he 
could trust. Until Grant was appointed in 1864, Lincoln 
was forced to plan strategy and supervise action in the 
field.
Lastly, the nature of the Civil War itself called for 
active involvement by the commander-in-chief. The goal of 
the conflict was not defeat of an external enemy, but
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rather preservation of the union itself. Social, political 
and economic norms became closely tied to military 
objectives. Lincoln felt that the Confederacy had to be 
defeated before other nations recognized its existence and 
possibly came to its aid. The need for a speedy victory 
amidst commanding union generals with their own political 
agendas served as a cause for Lincoln to exercise command 
authority.
Despite expansion of presidential commander-in-chief 
authority due to the unique circumstances of the Civil War, 
the trend returned to indirect presidential command under 
William McKinley. Klotz claims that McKinley's style was 
due to his lack of mental preparedness for war.(19)
In the several months prior to April 1898, McKinley 
concentrated his efforts on finding a peaceful solution to 
the call for Cuban independence. McKinley's subordinates 
in the armed forces, however, had already worked out a 
strategy for conducting a war against Spain. Once war was 
declared, McKinley merely became a "rubber stamp" for 
military commanders' plans.
Despite his lack of direct command over operations in 
the Spanish-American War, McKinley had more resources 
available than any previous president enabling him to run 
the show from Washington if he wished.(20) The War Room on 
the White House second floor consisted of 25 telegraph and 
15 telephone lines connecting the president to commanders
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in the Army and Navy. Maps indicating troop positions and 
movements were also included. A worldwide network of 
underwater telegraph cables also allowed the American navy 
to be directed to change plans without ships returning to 
port. The most likely reason for McKinley not feeling the 
pressure of previous presidents to control the war was that 
the war was short, publicly supported, and easily winnable.
America's next wartime president, Woodrow Wilson, was 
even less involved in the actual conduct of military 
operations in World War I. Wilson's background in public 
administration rather than in military matters led him to 
delegate authority for planning and execution to officials 
of the War and Navy Departments. His absence was even 
striking to the commanding general— General John Pershing. 
He remembered,
In the actual conduct of operations I was given
entire freedom and in this respect was to enjoy
an experience unique in our history.(21)
Wilson's hands off style does not indicate, however, an 
abdication of presidential power as commander-in-chief. In 
1917, he ordered the arming of the U.S. merchant fleet to 
protect American shipping from U-boat attacks by the 
Germans.(22) Wilson also called on Congress to grant him 
powers to mobilize war making resources by regulating 
essential items, requisitioning fuels, foods and feeds, 
taking over factories, and regulating prices. (23)
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World War II brought the permanent return of active 
presidential involvement as commander-in-chief. Franklin 
Roosevelt's personality and administrative style made him 
an active commander-in-chief, but the technological 
developments in weaponry and the politics of the post-war 
world would force all presidents after him to be strong 
commanders.
FDR had military experience which made him comfortable 
in the commander-in-chief role. He served as Assistant 
Secretary of the Navy in World War I and stayed in touch 
with naval developments after that.(24) Throughout the 
war, Roosevelt maintained an administrative hierarchy which 
kept him at the top of military decision making. Although 
the president's role as commander-in-chief in World War II 
alone is a whole story in itself, several highlights 
indicate the power exercised by FDR.
On October 5, 1937, the president denied any further 
U.S. claim to neutrality in his famous "quarantine" speech 
where protection of shipping lanes from a German naval 
threat became a priority. In September 1940, the president 
concluded an executive agreement selling 50 destroyers to 
Great Britain without consulting Congress until after the 
fact. The lend-lease program begun in January 1941 was 
another presidential initiative carried out without 
expressed Congressional approval. All of these events 
occurred long before any direct U.S. military involvement
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in the war.(25) World War II conferences at Casablanca, 
Quebec, Cairo, Teheran, and Yalta also provided 
well-publicized opportunities for the president to act 
decisively as commander-in-chief.
W. Taylor Reveley III traces the growth of
presidential war-making authority to three factors:
the evolving nature of those institutional 
characteristics of the presidency and Congress 
pertinent to the war powers; certain historical 
developments that have forced the Executive's 
characteristics over those of Congress; and, 
finally, the willingness of many Presidents, 
greater than that of Congress, to exercise 
their constitutional authority to the fullest 
and beyond.(26)
It is important to understand why each of the 
following cases was chosen and just how the nature of 
presidential war powers has changed since World War II.
The Truman administration's handling of the Korean War is 
critical because it illustrates the first changes in the 
very nature of war fighting due to the existence of nuclear 
weapons. The concept of limited war as demonstrated in 
Korea springs directly from the president's fear of 
escalation of the war to a nuclear exchange between the 
U.S. and the Soviet Union. Cold War competition and the 
possibility of mass death and destruction called for 
increased attention from the commander-in-chief in order to 
limit the war and avoid escalation to a nuclear 
confrontation. This increased attention by the president 
also forever changed the relationship between the civilian
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commander-in-chief and the military leaders who fought the 
war.
Massive retaliation strategy developed under President 
Eisenhower is important to our discussion because it 
reflects the first complete national military strategy 
developed and carried out during peacetime. Again,
American presence as an economic, political, and military 
leader in the nuclear age called for an active 
commander-in-chief to develop his foreign policy based on 
complex military considerations. The American tradition of 
small peacetime armies with rapid and massive mobilization 
of troops and equipment during time of war was no longer a 
realistic policy. The speedy nature of the nuclear threat 
from the Soviet Union called for large standing forces 
capable of nearly instant response. These large standing 
forces brought with them an unprecedented peacetime defense 
budget.
The Cuban Missile Crisis resulted from weaknesses in 
the Massive Retaliation strategy. It was now evident that 
large stockpiles of nuclear weapons, although fairly cheap, 
were not an effective deterrent to expanding communist 
influence. American inability to demonstrate the will to 
use such weapons for anything short of major conquest on 
the part of the Soviets destroyed American credibility.
Such weakness encouraged a challenge from the Soviets. 
Placement of Soviet nuclear missiles in Cuba demonstrated
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the need for a more credible American defense policy, but 
more importantly, demonstrated the need for a strong 
president to react quickly and accurately in a crisis 
situation. The nuclear threat increased the stakes in 
presidential crisis decision making.
Until the mid-1960s, the Congress remained mostly 
silent as presidential war powers steadily included more 
responsibility. President Johnson's leadership in Vietnam 
led to a change in that position. The Gulf of Tonkin 
incident triggered a large grant of war powers from the 
Congress to the president in the form of the Gulf of Tonkin 
Resolution. No act of Congress in history gave the 
president broader war powers without a declaration of war. 
As the details of the incident unfolded, serious 
misrepresentations were uncovered that destroyed 
Congressional trust in the president.
The conflict between the Congress and the president 
reached a turning point during the Nixon administration. 
Here we study the Cambodia invasion because it served as a 
"last straw" for a Congress and nation which had grown 
weary of the fighting in Vietnam. Presidential war powers 
had reached a peak as President Nixon carried the war into 
another sovereign country without the knowledge or consent 
of the Congress. In order to reassert itself in the field 
of war powers, the Congress passed the War Powers 
Resolution of 1973 over President Nixon's veto.
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The last three cases reflect attempts to balance the 
war powers of the president and Congress. Interestingly, 
all three were classified as rescue attempts; at least two 
arguably included more military force than was necessary to 
merely rescue American citizens.
The Ford administration's handling of the Havaguez 
seizure is important because it was the first military 
action following the passage of the War Powers Act. It 
illustrates continued presidential war making power with 
disregard for most aspects of the new legislation. Rather 
than challenge the act in court, the administration chose 
to ignore it and take the risk of Congressional opposition.
President Carter's attempt to rescue the hostages at 
the U.S. embassy in Tehran represents a rescue attempt on a 
more realistic scale. In this case, little argument can be 
made that the president was being adventuresome. However, 
the political repercussions of operational failure seemed 
to be more damaging to the presidency than successful 
full-scale military operations conducted without consulting 
Congress.
Finally, President Reagan's orders to invade the 
island of Grenada reflect more of a balance in presidential 
and Congressional war powers. For the first time, the 
president appeared to recognize and accept the limitations 
of the War Powers Act. His willingness to abide by all 
provisions of the act are a significant change and may
20
indicate movement toward more cooperation between the 
president and the Congress with regard to future war powers 
questions.
The war powers of the president appear to have 
undergone a fundamental change after World War II. Up 
until 1973, presidential war powers continued to grow at a 
perhaps alarming rate based on changing conditions 
affecting the presidency. With passage of the War Powers 
Act, this expansion seems to have slowed. Presidents since 
then have been trying to find the proper balance between 
themselves and the Congress that allows for adequate 
handling of war powers emergencies.
We will now examine historical cases from each 
presidency since World War II and find that development of 
nuclear weapons and growth of the United States as a world 
economic and military power during that period have 
significantly expanded the president's war powers.
CHAPTER II. TRUMAN-LIMITED WAR IN KOREA
Harry S. Truman is the only president in this study to 
have experienced two major wars as the commander-in-chief. 
His administration, therefore, provides numerous examples 
of a president exercising his commander-in-chief powers.
For purposes of this study, we will focus only on the 
second war of the Truman administration, the war in Korea.
This case is unique and important because it involved 
the first use of the United Nations in a combat situation. 
In the past, commitment of U.S. forces to military 
situations allied with other military forces was only as a 
result of a specific treaty. In this case, American 
membership in the United Nations was certainly established 
by treaty, but use of American military forces by that 
organization was a much more indirect agreement.
The Korean War is also important to the expansion of 
presidential war powers since World War II because it 
represents the first changes in the nature of war making 
due to the existence of nuclear weapons. The limited war 
concept developed directly from President Truman's fear 
that the conflict might escalate to a nuclear exchange 
with the Soviets if a "total war" was fought. Cold War 
competition and fears of the destruction of civilization 
created the need for increased attention to military 
details by the president acting as commander-in-chief.
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As the only American with the power to order the use of 
nuclear weapons, President Truman felt that he alone would 
decide the strategy of the war. Participation in the 
United Nations and the existence of nuclear weapons would 
be crucial to the development of modern presidential war 
powers.
The historical background concerning Korea and the 
United Nations is important to understanding how and why 
things happened the way they did in 1950. After the atomic 
bombings of August 6th and 9th, 1945, the president was 
encouraged by many of his advisors to occupy the Korean 
peninsula. Basically, the goal these advisors had was to 
race the Soviets for influence over territory before the 
end of the Second World War.(27)
The War Department suggested the 38th parallel as an 
operational/occupational dividing line between U.S. and 
Soviet forces. As Secretary of State Dean Acheson 
remembers:
On about the 12th of August, 1945, the Pentagon 
sent over to us in the State Department— I was then 
an Assistant Secretary of State— a memorandum dealing with many affairs, but among them it said that the 
Japanese troops north of the 38th parallel in Korea should surrender to the Russians and those south 
should surrender to a representative of General 
MacArthur.
This was exactly what it purported to be. It did not 
intend to be a boundary. It did not intend to be 
zones of occupation. It was merely that for 
convenience troops north of this dividing line should 
surrender to one commander, those south of it to 
another. And this was done.
23
Immediately afterward we discovered in Korea, as we 
discovered in Germany, that when one dealt with the 
Russians any sort of dividing line meant much more 
than one had supposed it was going to mean. It meant that an Iron Curtain descended at that point and that 
everything north of the 38th parallel became 
completely Russian and everything south under Allied 
or American control.(28)
President Truman accepted the War Department 
recommendation and issued General Order No. 1 to General 
MacArthur, commander of the Pacific theater. This order 
outlined the details of the impending Japanese surrender 
and established the 38th parallel as the operational 
dividing line for the surrender of Japanese forces in the 
Korean peninsula. The XXIV Corps in Okinawa would accept 
the Japanese surrender south of the 38th parallel. Stalin 
approved of Truman's plan and arranged to accept the 
surrender north of 38 degrees north.(29)
The first warning of possible military trouble came 
from the U.S. commander in Korea, General Hodge, who voiced 
concern about the Russian attitude toward Korean territory. 
In February, 1947, Hodge told the president a civil war 
would break out if the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. could not soon 
agree on a plan for Korean unification.
In the summer of 1947, General MacArthur agreed with 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff that American occupation of 
southern Korea was not cost effective. MacArthur conceded 
that Korea was of little strategic importance to the United 
States and recommended withdrawing troops stationed 
there.(30)
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President Truman then went to the United Nations with 
the Soviet occupation problem. On September 17, 1947, 
George Marshall made a speech to the UN proposing elections 
in each sector supervised by a UN commission. This 
election would serve as the basis for a new government and 
arrangements would be made for withdrawal of all American 
and Soviet forces. The Soviet delegation countered with a 
proposal for a complete withdrawal of all forces by spring 
1948, leaving the Koreans to their own devices to organize 
a government. The interesting point of this proposal is 
that the Soviets would leave a well-equipped and 
well-trained North Korean force alone with an unarmed and 
disorganized group of South Koreans. The United Nations 
ultimately approved the American proposal over a Soviet 
abstention.(31)
Despite the UN plan, the commission sent to run the 
election was denied access to the northern sector by the 
Red Army. As a result, elections were only conducted in 
southern Korea and the Republic of Korea was formed on July 
17, 1948. The United States transferred power to the new 
government on August 15. The Soviets did eventually 
withdraw their forces from North Korea after the Americans 
left, establishing a communist government in North Korea by 
June 29, 1949.
Speaking to the National Press Club on January 12, 
1950, Secretary of State Acheson described a defensive
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perimeter that would define U.S. strategic interests in the
Pacific. A line running from Alaska through the Aleutian
islands to Japan south through the Ryuku islands to the
Philippines would serve as a forward area of defense. This
perimeter, drawn by the Joint Chiefs, the National Security
Council, and the president and agreed to by MacArthur,
intentionally did not include Korea.
Although facts later uncovered no longer support the
claim, right wing Republicans would claim that Secretary
Acheson invited a North Korean invasion by leaving Korea
out of the perimeter. In fact, the Secretary said,
So far as the military security in the other areas 
of the Pacific is concerned, it must be clear that 
no person can guarantee these areas against military 
attack...But should such an attack occur, the initial 
reliance must be on the people attacked to resist it 
and then upon the commitments of the entire civilized 
world under the charter of the United Nations.(30)
Even as this speech was made, North Korean hit and run
squads were making guerilla raids south of the 38th
parallel to create disorder. These raids continued through
the spring of 1950. The Central Intelligence Agency
informed the president that North Korea was ready for
full-scale war at any time. MacArthur aide Major General
Courtney Whitney reported that 1500 intelligence warnings
were sent to Washington that spring including one on March
10, indicating a strong possibility of a June attack.(32)
Despite the large number of warnings, Korea was only one of
several potential hot spots identified that spring.
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Back in the United Nations, another event took place 
that would have profound effects on the events of June, 
1950. In early January, arguments were heard concerning 
the Chinese seat both in the General Assembly and as a 
permanent member of the Security Council. Mao's recent 
successful revolution in China created the dilemma of 
another communist government on the Security Council. The 
United States maintained that the government on Formosa was 
still the legitimate government of China while the Soviets 
claimed Mao's government was the only legitimate Chinese 
government. When the American position won out, the 
Soviets walked out of the Security Council. This loss of a 
veto position would later be very important to action in 
Korea.
At 4:00am local time on June 25, 1950, forces of the 
North Korean army invaded South Korea. Their first thrust 
was along the Onjin peninsula. Five U.S. advisors with the 
17th ROK regiment soon radioed Seoul that they were about 
to be overrun. While amphibious landings took place on the 
eastern coast, seven well-armed and well-trained North 
Korean infantry divisions totalling 90,000 men attacked 
along the border where defenses consisted of five thin ROK 
divisions. North Korean forces captured Kaesong 35 miles 
northwest of the capital of Seoul within hours.
As stated in Acheson's January speech, the United 
States had no plans in place to repel the attack.
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Secretary Acheson informed the president at his home in 
Independence. Truman's first decision was to call on the 
UN Security Council, but he also remarked to Acheson,
"Dean, we've got to stop the sons of bitches no matter 
what."(33) It was evident the president would act 
regardless of what the United Nations decided. On what 
basis the president felt justified in using U.S. forces 
without a UN resolution or declaration of war by Congress 
is unclear. Statements made later indicate President 
Truman felt his position as commander-in-chief of the armed 
forces was sufficient authority to use those forces when 
carrying out administration foreign policy.
Immediate recommendations were made by the State and 
Defense Departments. Acheson specifically called for 
American nationals to be evacuated from Korea, use of the 
U.S. Air Force to protect the evacuation and secure ports 
and airports, orders to General MacArthur to give ROK 
forces additional arms and ammunition, positioning the 7th 
fleet in the Formosa Strait to prevent a conflict with 
mainland China, additional assistance to South Korea based 
on a UN Security Council resolution, and an increase in 
military aid to Indochina.(34) These moves followed 
historical precedent. Use of American forces would be 
strictly to protect Americans on foreign soil. Even before 
the Security Council had a chance to meet, Assistant 
Secretary of State for UN Affairs John Hickerson said,
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"...a decision was reached for us to give all-out air and 
naval support, under the United Nations, to Korea."(35)
This decision did open new questions concerning the 
authority of the president to commit U.S. forces to action 
under the United Nations without consultation with or 
approval of Congress.
The first report arriving from General MacArthur 
indicated that all territory west of the Imjin River was 
lost. This included the Onjin peninsula and the cities of 
Yonan, Panmunjom, and Kaesong. He called for immediate 
U.S. air support to protect the Seoul airport. An 
evacuation of American personnel was begun immediately.
In Moscow, U.S. embassy staffer Walworth Barbour 
reported the attack as,
a clear-cut Soviet challenge which in our considered 
opinion the U.S. should answer firmly and swiftly as it constitutes direct threat [to] our leadership of 
the free world against Soviet Communist imperialism. 
The ROK is a creation of U.S. policy and of U.S.-led 
UN action. Its destruction would have calculably grave unfavorable repercussions for the U.S. in Japan, 
SEA (southeast Asia) and in other areas as well.(36)
Barbour stressed that all assistance, including military,
would be needed to keep the South Koreans independent.
Truman did consider asking Congress for a joint
resolution of support before acting, but was convinced to
avoid such a request by Acheson. The Secretary explained,
"it would precipitate attacks on him by hostile Republicans
and generate lengthy discussions of the eventual effect and
financial expenditures involved in this intervention."(37)
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The question remains whether threat of political attack by 
the opposing party in Congress is sufficient justification 
to commit military forces to battle without consulting with 
the Congress. As an alternative, the president decided to 
meet with Congressional leaders on the morning of June 27 
to inform them of the events in Korea and his decisions.
No one present in the initial staff meetings disputed the 
president's actions. Luckily for President Truman and 
perhaps less luckily for constitutional scholars, this lack 
of opposition from congressional leaders served as tacit 
approval for presidential action.
Soon after Truman ordered military intervention, the 
State Department released a statement explaining the powers 
allowing the president to act without congressional 
approval.
The President, as commander-in-Chief of the Armed 
Forces of the United States, has full control over the use thereof. He also has authority to conduct 
the foreign relations of the United States. Since 
the beginning of the United States history, he has, 
on numerous occasions, utilized these powers in 
sending armed forces abroad.
The administration went so far as to declare that the
dispatch of troops to Korea was based on unlimited
presidential prerogative. In testimony before the Senate
Committees on Foreign Relations and Armed Services,
Secretary Acheson stated:
Not only has the President the authority to use the 
armed forces in carrying out the broad foreign policy 
of the United States and implementing treaties, but it 
is equally clear that this authority may not be
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interfered with by the Congress in the exercise of 
powers which it has under the Constitution.(38)
Congress responded to this declaration with no
response at all. Although a constitutional argument
certainly was available, it seems not enough opposition to
presidential action could be found in the Congress to mount
a serious threat to President Truman's plans.
It is entirely possible the president's advisors
recommended against a Congressional resolution in support
of his action in Korea because of previous legislation
indicating an unwillingness on the part of Congress to give
up war powers to the president. In the post-world War II
environment, widespread approval was voiced for the United
Nations Charter, the document designed to keep the peace by
joint action. Despite this near-unanimous support,
Congress refused to allow for the possibility of lone
action by the president.
Soon after acceptance of the UN Charter, Congress 
passed the United Nations Participation Act. The Act's 
Section 6 authorized the president to negotiate military 
agreements with the UN Security Council and make U.S. 
forces available for peace-keeping operations.(39)
However, Congress withheld the right to determine how these 
forces would be used. The Act states that any agreements 
negotiated with the Security Council are "subject to the 
approval of Congress by appropriate act or joint 
resolution." In the Korean case, a lack of Congressional
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action must be interpreted as approval for the president's 
actions.
Congress even took extra measures to insure that the
executive branch could not misinterpret the Act. The
legislation included a provision that "nothing herein
contained shall be construed as an authorization to the
President by the Congress to make available to the Security
Council...armed forces, facilities, or assistance in
addition to the forces, facilities, and assistance provided
for in such special agreement or agreements."(40)
Secretary Acheson claims consideration of
Congressional opposition was not the reason the
administration did not seek a joint resolution. They truly
felt the president was acting in accordance with the
commander-in-chief power outlined in the Constitution. The
administration was more concerned that delays resulting
from discussion would be dangerous to our troops already
deployed in the theater. In his words,
The outcome of the battle was not at all clear. It 
seemed to me if, at this time, action was pending 
before the Congress, by which hearings might be held, 
and long inquiries were being entered into as to 
whether the President had the authority to do it, or whether we needed Congressional authority for matters of that sort— we would be doing about the worst thing 
we could possibly do for the support of our troops and for their morale.(41)
Whatever the constitutional and legal issues, public 
support for the president's action was initially very 
positive. The New York Times called the president's
32
initiative "momentous and courageous" and said it "produced 
a transformation in the spirit of the United States 
Government." New York's Herald Tribune also supported 
Truman's intervention in Korea, saying, "The President has 
acted-and-spoken-with a magnificent courage and terse 
decision...It was time to draw a line."(42)
Congressional support for the president followed that 
of the public. The House of Representatives hurried to 
extend the Selective Service Act by a vote of 315-4.
Truman was allowed to call up the National Guard and 
reserves to active duty for up to 21 months. Initially, 
the only vocal dissent came from American Labor Party 
representative Vito Marcantonio of New York who accused the 
president of bypassing the constitution and declaring war 
on Korea by himself.(43)
At 5:00am on June 30, 1950, President Truman approved 
MacArthur's request for one regimental combat team to 
reinforce the ROK army. Later that morning the cabinet met 
to consider Chiang Kai-shek's offer of 30,000 troops to 
assist in the defensive effort. Despite Nationalist 
China's position as a permanent member of the UN Security 
Council, the administration turned down the offer because 
of problems of reliability, weakness, and lack of loyalty 
to Chiang among the Chinese troops. The cabinet also 
approved authorizing General MacArthur to use his four 
divisions and a naval blockade against the North Koreans.
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Again, the American media sided with the president. 
Both the Washington Post and the New York Times published 
editorials praising the president and his cabinet for their 
firm and timely stand in Korea.(44) It is unfortunate for 
Truman that he did not even consider "backing in" 
Congressional support for his action. His view of himself 
as the sole responsible individual for intervention in 
Korea became a political nightmare once the war began to go 
against UN forces. Although it never acted to stop the 
president, Congress found it easy to oppose him when the 
going got tough. An interesting lesson to be learned is 
how political players can use the rules governing their 
activities to pursue their own political agenda. Congress 
had no need to question the president's constitutional 
authority when American forces were winning, but found that 
constitutional question much more important once the war 
had gone sour.
Some minor dissent was already starting to surface in
Congress where Senator Taft of Ohio said,
His action unquestionably has brought about a de facto war with the government of northern Korea. He has 
brought that war about without consulting Congress and 
without congressional approval. We have a situation in which in a far-distant part of the world one nation 
has attacked another, and if the president can 
intervene in Korea without congressional approval, he 
can go to war in Malaya or Indonesia or Iran or South America.(45)
The administration countered with the argument that 
it was merely carrying out the intent of the United
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Nations Charter which allowed the Security Council to take 
whatever military actions necessary to restore 
international peace and security.
To fully understand Truman's actions in Korea as 
commander-in-chief and his later problems with General 
MacArthur, it is important to know just what the 
administration's objectives in Korea were. According to 
President Truman:
The strong got away with attacking the weak, and I 
wasn't going to let this attack on the Republic of 
Korea, which had been set up by the United Nations, 
go forward. Because if it wasn't stopped, it would 
lead to a third world war, and I wasn't going to let 
that happen. Not while I was President.
That's what a lot of people never understood, 
including the general we had over there at the time. 
This was a police action, a limited war, whatever 
you want to call it to stop aggression and to prevent 
a big war. And that's all it ever was. I don't know 
why some people could never get that through their heads.(46)
Bert Cochran points out that no one knew then, nor 
really knows now whether Stalin called for or approved of 
the North Korean attack. It seems to have been at odds 
with his generally cautious foreign policy toward areas of 
American interest. At least one former member of the 
American occupation government claims that the North 
Koreans acted in a manner designed to entrap the Soviets 
into supporting them.(47) In any case, all the president's 
comments seem to indicate the United States assumed the 
attack in Korea was only part of a Soviet master plan for
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world domination rather than the result of three years of 
civil strife over an arbitrary border.
NSC Report 73/4 of August 25, 1950 outlined the U.8. 
strategy based on the objectives stated by the president. 
This report recommended to the president that he must 
regain the initiative, deter further aggression, and 
increase the American ability to defeat aggression. These 
goals were to be attained by building up military forces, 
gaining intelligence information on UN members willing to 
oppose the USSR on satellite aggression, and being prepared 
to meet a Soviet attack with one of our own.(48)
Since globail war was considered imminent in the event 
of a Soviet attack in Europe, it would be important to 
localize action and resort to the United Nations. It would 
also be imperative to expose the Soviets as the aggressor 
as early as possible to mobilize world opinion.
The Korean element of the strategy was to meet and 
defeat a Soviet attack in the peninsula. It was considered 
imperative that we not engage Communist China in general 
war.
President Truman addressed the nation on television 
and radio on September 1, 1950 outlining the following 
objectives in Korea. First, the United States believed in 
the United Nations Charter and with it, a free and 
independent, united Korea. We did not want expansion of 
the conflict into general war, nor did we want to fight the
36
Chinese. Our goal was to keep Formosa out of the conflict, 
but to insure its independence. The United States believed 
in the freedom of all far eastern nations. We did not 
believe in aggressive or preventive war, and above all, we 
wanted peace.(49)
Two weeks after the president's address to a worried 
nation, General MacArthur withdrew the marines from the 
Pusan perimeter and combined them with his last army 
division in Japan to form the offensive force of one of the 
most impressive tactical moves in military history. On 
September 15, 1950, MacArthur's forces landed at Inchon 
well behind the North Korean lines, secured the capital 
city of Seoul and cut off communications and supply lines 
to forward North Korean troops. Simultaneously, American 
forces around Pusan broke out of the perimeter sending the 
North Koreans into retreat.
By early October, UN forces had returned to the 38th 
parallel and were pursuing enemy divisions into North 
Korea. With the earlier goal of stopping aggression and 
returning to the status quo achieved, the United Nations 
now issued a proclamation on October 7th calling for the 
invasion of North Korea in order to reunify the country. 
This was actually a return to the original goal of the UN 
stated November 14, 1947. This change of goals would have 
serious consequences for UN forces.
37
In late October, UN forces began to capture Chinese 
prisoners as they moved northward. Although MacArthur did 
not know it, General Nieh Yeh-jung, acting chief of the 
Communist Chinese general staff, had discussed the American 
crossing of the 38th parallel with the Indian ambassador to 
Peking on September 25th. At that time he told the 
ambassador that China would not allow the United States to 
advance to the Yalu River. In public speeches on September 
30th and October 1st, Chou En-lai added that China would 
resist aggression in North Korea. Finally, on October 3rd, 
the Indian ambassador was informed that if the U.S. crossed 
the 38th parallel, China would enter the war on the side of 
the North Koreans.(50)
By the first weeks of November, large numbers of 
Chinese troops had joined the North Koreans. MacArthur 
reported that enemy capabilities were now three times what 
they had been before Chinese intervention. An overwhelming 
Chinese offensive followed, causing MacArthur to retreat 
back south of the 38th parallel and give up Seoul by 
January, 1951.
On December 14, the UN General Assembly resolved to 
reestablish the 38th parallel as a ceasefire line. The 
October resolution calling for reunification was dropped, 
and the goal once again became to restore the divided Korea 
in existence in June.
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The constantly changing objective became a source of 
irritation to General MacArthur and was a major cause of 
his falling out with President Truman. Back in August, the 
general had written to the chief official of the Veterans 
of Foreign Wars about U.S. policy toward Formosa.
President Truman had seen this letter as an attack on 
his foreign policy and ordered MacArthur to withdraw it. 
Although the general did so, Truman was ready to relieve 
him then and replace him with the Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, General Omar Bradley.(51) Advisors 
cautioned the president that MacArthur was extremely 
popular with Republican opponents of the admininistration 
and firing him would be political suicide.
Instead, the president traveled to Wake Island to meet 
MacArthur and come to an understanding about their 
relationship. Donovan calls the conference at Wake the 
"high watermark of the Truman-MacArthur relationship."(52) 
The two men discussed chances of Chinese intervention and 
the general reportedly apologized to the president for this 
VFW message. All appeared to be well until the Chinese 
entered the war.
MacArthur had interpreted the October 7th UN 
resolution as a call for total victory in order to reunify 
Korea. The December change in plans ran contrary to his 
sensibilities as a soldier. On December 1st, General 
MacArthur made statements to U.S. News and World Report and
the United Press publicly criticizing U.S. policy and 
saying the European allies were "selfish" and 
"shortsighted" in opposing the expansion of the war to 
fight China. He called the order limiting bombing to 
targets outside Manchuria "an enormous handicap, without 
precedent in military history."(53)
International response was incredible and the 
president called Acheson, General Marshall, and General 
Bradley together to determine what to do about the 
general's statements. Despite all the clamor and evident 
insubordination, Truman still did not seriously consider 
firing the general. "You pick your man, you've got to back 
him up. That's the only way a military organization can 
work," he said.(54) Apparently the only concern expressed 
at the meeting was how to get the general out of the mess 
his statements had made.
On December 5, President Truman issued an order to 
MacArthur requiring that all future public statements be 
cleared through him to insure their compliance with 
administration policy.
By the end of March 1951, the Truman administration 
decided that the major objectives in Korea had been 
achieved-the aggressor had been pushed back to his own 
country, the United States and the United Nations had 
demonstrated their determination, and the moral and 
military strength of the Western allies had been
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significantly increased.(55) When General MacArthur heard
that the president was preparing to announce truce
negotiations, he pre-empted the president with an
invitation to meet the enemy commander in the field and
discuss military means to end the war. Worse yet,
MacArthur implied that refusal might mean expanding
hostilities to the Chinese homeland.
President Truman was irate, calling the invitation
an act totally disregarding all directives to abstain 
from any declarations on foreign policy...a challenge 
to the authority of the President under the Constitu­
tion. It also flouted the policy of the United 
Nations. By this act MacArthur left me no choice-I 
could no longer tolerate his insubordination.(56)
The Joint Chiefs reprimanded MacArthur and demanded all
Communist peace offers be forwarded to Washington
immediately.
Within two weeks MacArthur angered the president even
more. In a letter to Joseph W. Martin, the Republican
leader in the House, the general said,
It seems strangely difficult for some to realize that 
here in Asia is where the Communist conspirators have 
elected to make their play for global conquest, and that we have joined the issue thus raised on the 
battlefield; that here we fight Europe's war with arms 
while the diplomats there still fight it with words; that if we lose the war to Communism in Asia the fall 
of Europe is inevitable, win it and Europe most 
probably would avoid war and yet preserve freedom. As 
you point out, we must win. There is no substitute for victory.(57)
This was the last straw for Truman who met with the Joint 
Chiefs and his closest advisors on April 5th to draft orders 
to relieve General MacArthur. General Marshall wrote
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the order, and in a communications blunder, reporters got 
hold of the text before it could be delivered to MacArthur. 
The political consequences of that error made the order even 
tougher on the president.
The disagreement between President Truman and General 
MacArthur illustrates the complexity of the commander-in 
chief role in the modern day. MacArthur had a warrior 
mind. He had been an Army officer for over 50 years and had 
experienced four wars. In 1931, he told a congressional 
committee, "the objective of any warring nation is victory 
immediate and complete."(58) In Korea he rejected the idea 
that force could be limited. MacArthur saw war not as an 
extension of politics, but rather a result of the breakdown 
of politics.
Although MacArthur did not oppose the pre-war 
abandonment of Korea, he did believe that once committed, he 
must be allowed to win. The general's philosophy of 
fighting was that if a nation is not willing to make a total 
commitment to its war effort, then it shouldn't fight at 
all.
Truman saw his role as commander-in-chief quite 
clearly.
He's the absolute commander of the armed forces 
of the United States in time of war. He's the commander of the armed forces when they're called 
out for any purpose, if he wants to take control 
of them. Nobody else can do it.(59)
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He realized that improvements in communications, alliances
and weaponry, especially nuclear weaponry, made the world a
much more complex place. The concept of limited war was
here to stay, and with it increased control and
responsibility for the president.
As for why he fired MacArthur, Truman replies,
I fired him because he wouldn't respect the authority of the President. That's the answer 
to that. I didn't fire him because he was a 
dumb son of a bitch, although he was, but 
that's not against the law for generals. If 
it was, half to three-quarters of them would 
be in jail.(60)
Truman's relationship with MacArthur illustrates an 
important lesson about the modern president's increased 
responsibility as a military commander. The necessity to 
limit war in order to avoid nuclear war forces the 
commander-in-chief to take a more active role in controlling 
military operations. Although it may be argued that 
presidents have always had the power to command their forces 
directly, the existence of nuclear weapons requires the 
president to be actively involved in military operations. 
Military leaders can no longer be trained to be concerned 
only with victory in the classic sense.(61) Limited war may 
require a reasonable peace in order to prevent a major war. 
MacArthur could never have accepted such an idea, but Harry 
Truman realized that in an age of nuclear weapons, there 
might not be able to be any clear cut winners. The weapon
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designed to win a total war now served as the basis for a 
new type of limited war.
The sharing of powers between the Congress and the 
president regarding war powers had become even more complex. 
By signing the United Nations charter, the United States 
agreed to be an active player in world affairs. Despite 
historical traditions of isolationism, U.S. involvement in 
the United Nations and development as a major economic power 
forced an increased role for American military forces. 
Control of these forces by civilian authority required some 
agreement on the roles of the president and the Congress.
Although the administration had originally justified 
its actions as within the constitutional powers of the 
commander-in-chief, subsequent Congressional opposition 
forced a fail-back position relying on American membership 
and leadership in the United Nations. The president now 
had one more reason to exercise his commander-in-chief 
powers with or without the consent of Congress.
CHAPTER III. EISENHOWER-MASSIVE RETALIATION STRATEGY
Although the Constitution holds the president 
responsible for wartime decisions as commander-in-chief, 
another concern of the founders appears to have been to 
keep military men out of politics during peacetime.(62) Up 
until World War II, with limited exceptions, this desire 
was met. The United States never maintained large 
peacetime armed forces and active soldiers and sailors 
only occasionally were an important part of public life.
A unique characteristic of the American presidency 
since the Second World War is that the president is almost 
daily faced with issues which had once only been concerns 
during wartime. As such, it is natural that the 
president's role as commander-in-chief should expand to 
meet the needs of a constant state of emergency. The world 
faced by President Eisenhower was one of conflict or 
potential conflict in multiple theaters, such as Central 
America, the eastern Mediterranean, the Middle East, India, 
southeast Asia, Japan, Korea, Africa, and central Europe.
Rather than study a particular event during the 
Eisenhower administration, it is helpful to take a look at 
the formulation of national defense strategy during that 
period. Although atomic weapons were developed and used 
during the 1940s, no particular national defense strategy 
was developed until the Eisenhower administration. This is 
due to the fact that the short peacetime period between
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World War II and Korea saw no rival to the 0.8. atomic 
capability. With a monopoly on atomic power, the United 
States enjoyed no fear of attack from another nuclear 
enemy.
The development of massive retaliation strategy is 
important in the evolution of presidential war powers 
because it was the first real American national military 
strategy. Prior to the nuclear age, American military 
planners had done relatively insignificant exercises in 
guessing who the next enemy might be and developing 
contingency plans to deal with that threat.
From the broader view, it was natural that the 
president and his staff have the role of developing 
national military strategy. After all, military commanders 
are generally held accountable for strategic planning and 
the president had already begun to take a more active part 
as a military commander during the Truman administration.
In addition, massive retaliation strategy was as much a 
foreign policy eis it was a military strategy. The threat 
of U.S. nuclear attack was to serve as a deterrent to 
Soviet activity running contrary to American interests. 
Foreign policy planning was certainly in the domain of the 
president and the State Department.
What is less natural is that the Congress appeared to 
have little interest in a national military strategy even 
though the existence of large standing military forces
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during peacetime was unprecedented and would be a 
significant strain on the federal budget. The founders' 
fear of a militarily strong executive seems to have 
disappeared by 1953.
We have already seen how a fear of atomic weapons 
limited the conduct of the war in Korea. The 1950s brought 
much more emphasis on the Cold War and how nuclear weapons 
might be employed in that type of "engagement." A second 
concern was the typical American tendency to disband 
considerable numbers of military forces in the absence of a 
hot war. A need for constant military readiness in a 
peacetime environment posed a new and unique problem to the 
Eisenhower administration.
When Dwight D. Eisenhower was elected president, the 
Soviet Union had already exploded its first atomic bomb on 
September 24, 1949. Soon after Ike took office, the 
Soviets tested their first hydrogen bomb on August 12,
1953. Shortly after the H-bomb test, the U.S. Atomic 
Energy Commission announced that the USSR had begun tests 
of tactical nuclear weapons. Although America still had 
the edge in weapon technology and delivery systems, it was 
clear to the administration that a new threat existed which 
would demand constant readiness on the part of American 
armed forces.
President Truman's Air Policy Commission had reported 
in December 1947 that the USSR could obtain "substantial
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quantities" of atomic weapons within five years and 
concluded:
This means that the traditional peacetime strategy of the United States must be changed radically. We 
can no longer count on having our cities and the 
rest of our mainland untouched in a future war...We must count on our homeland becoming increasingly 
vulnerable as the weapons increase in destructiveness 
and the means of delivering them are improved.(63)
The Commission's prediction had come true. Despite a lack
of accurate delivery vehicles that would not be disclosed
until much later, the Soviets now had the capability to
strike at the American homeland with little or no warning,
a capability that no other nation had ever had before in
U.S. history.
Besides the military threat, the Eisenhower 
administration had to deal with two problems left over from 
the Truman presidency. The country was disenchanted with 
the concept of limited war as it was carried out in Korea, 
and the resources required to fight the Korean War had 
placed a heavy burden on the American economy.(64) The 
search was on to find a defense strategy that would provide 
for the nation's defense needs, but reduce the economic 
burdens of maintaining large peacetime forces.
What resulted became known as the New Look policy or 
the "long haul" concept.(65) Secretary of State John 
Poster Dulles outlined the policy in a speech to the 
Council on Foreign Relations on January 12, 1954. Dulles 
recognized the burdens of an emergency mentality and said
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that the cost and reactionary nature of emergency measures 
could not be depended on as a permanent policy.
The administration defined the threat as Communist 
ideology. Assumptions based on that threat were that the 
Soviet Union could never really live in peace alongside 
free nations and that international security would remain 
threatened by Communism as long as ideology remained 
unchanged.(66) In addition, the United States had stated 
that Communism was a totally unacceptable way of life. 
Therefore, any military strategy designed to meet the 
threat must be inherently flexible, in order to meet the 
demands of the rigid economic and political framework 
imposed on military strategy by a democratic way of 
life.(67)
Dulles underscored the need for a maximum deterrent at 
an acceptable cost:
We want, for ourselves and the other free nations, 
a maximum deterrent at a bearable cost.Local defense will always be important. But there 
is no local defense which alone will contain the 
mighty landpower of the Communist world. Local defenses must be reinforced by the further deterrent 
of massive retaliatory power. A potential 
aggressor must know that he cannot always prescribe 
battle conditions that suit him...The way to deter aggression is for the free 
community to be willing and able to respond 
vigorously at places and with means of its own 
choosing.(64)
The Secretary actually discussed the nature of the threat 
and massive retaliation strategy as early as May 1952 in an 
article for Life magazine entitled "A Policy of
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Boldness."(68) He described a united Soviet and Chinese 
army of 3-4 million men threatening 20 nations over a 
20,000 mile boundary.
Dulles accurately pointed out that current or 
projected U.S. forces failed to meet that threat by a wide 
margin. The only solution, then, was to design a force 
that could retaliate instantly in a place where it would 
hurt the enemy at times of our own choosing.
The Eisenhower administration determined that nuclear 
weapons were the answer to the defense problem. Long-range 
strategic nuclear forces would provide the core of the 
country's defense forces and serve as the overall 
deterrent. Shorter range tactical nuclear weapons would 
provide greater local firepower and thus, a smaller need 
for large conventional armies.
Massive retaliation policy has a number of meanings, 
all of which were mentioned by the Eisenhower 
administration over the course of its eight years in 
office.(69) First is the concept of deterrence. Basically 
deterrence strategy means that our reaction to moves of an 
aggressor become so costly to that aggressor that he no 
longer can see the benefit in carrying out an aggressive 
policy. Massive retaliation strategy left no question that 
the United States would react as it saw fit in times and 
places of its own choosing with means of its own choosing 
up to and including the use of strategic nuclear weapons.
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Eisenhower's advisors sought to keep the Communist world 
guessing by never stating when a nuclear response would be 
appropriate or if an enemy's military bases or cities would 
be held at risk.(70)
The second meaning of massive retaliation strategy is 
that selected acts of aggression can quickly be expanded 
beyond the desires of the aggressor. Eisenhower sent the 
message that the United States would no longer feel the 
need to limit itself the way it had in Korea. Dulles 
specifically referred to the limitations on the doctrine of 
"hot pursuit" used to prevent U.S. fighter aircraft from 
chasing down North Korean and Chinese MiGs into Chinese 
airspace.(71) Because of this self-imposed restriction, 
Dulles explained, the enemy was able to execute a 
successful campaign against UN forces and exploit the 
weakness created by the restriction. This success resulted 
in unneeded waste of lives among UN forces and delayed 
successful prosecution of the war. Such self-imposed 
restrictions were no longer to be a part of American 
strategy.
A third meaning of the Eisenhower policy was that the 
U.S. now had the ability to strike at the so-called silent 
aggressor. Actual combatants were no longer the only 
possible targets of a retaliatory strike. If the United 
States had sufficient evidence of an enemy acting as a 
supplier or an instigator in some aggressive act, we would
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hold them responsible for that attack and respond in a way 
we found appropriate.
Lastly, the massive retaliation doctrine implied that 
an actual attack on the United States or its vital 
interests would result in a massive counterattack 
destroying all of an aggressor's warmaking capabilities. 
Such a policy would make any thought of attack against the 
United States too costly to consider seriously.
According to a presidential budget message, the 
primary mission assigned to U.S. forces "is to maintain 
ready nuclear-air-retaliatory forces so strong that they 
will deter a potential aggressor from initiating an 
attack."(72) National defense priorities in order of 
precedence became deterrence, continental defense, and 
actual combat operations.
The defense budget and procurement goal was to avoid a 
series of peaks and valleys. There was no time set to have 
U.S. capabilities reach a peak. According to Paul Peeters, 
"any attempt to establish some date of maximum danger is 
futile."(73) Slow steady growth using cheaper nuclear 
weaponry over large manpower accounts would insure adequate 
defense capability while promoting a strong economy.
As Soviet nuclear capabilities continued to increase 
through the 1950s, the administration's reliance on nuclear 
weapons began to come into question. The theme most 
undermining the credibility of the strategy was reliance on
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tactical nuclear weapons in a small conventional scenario 
with a Soviet foe capable of quickly accelerating the 
conflict to streitegic nuclear exchanges. (74)
In response to this criticism, the administration now 
played a game of what became called "brinksmanship." The 
U.S. would continue to be willing to retaliate with nuclear 
weapons if necessary to defend important interests. Now 
the U.S. would even be willing to risk mutual destruction 
in order to maintain deterrence. This concept eventually 
became known as mutual assured destruction or MAD and has 
served as the core of strategic nuclear policy ever since.
An interesting observation is that Congress never 
attempted to take an active role in U.S. nuclear strategy. 
Perhaps rightly so, the president exercised his authority 
as commander-in-chief of the armed forces to develop a 
strategy for the use of his forces. The real concern of 
the Congress at this time was not military strategy. After 
all, the country was not at war. Congressional concern 
centered around getting the economy under control by 
reducing defense spending. Nuclear weapons were a 
conveniently cheap way to show an attempt at defense while 
reducing the budget through manpower cuts. Since massive 
retaliation strategy served the defense needs of the 
commander-in-chief and the economic needs of the Congress, 
little disagreement was voiced between the executive and 
the legislature.
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While massive retaliation strategy can arguably 
account for a prompt end to the Korean War out of a fear of 
a U.S. nuclear strike, a number of events throughout 
President Eisenhower's two terms showed the weaknesses of 
the strategy. Inadequate responses to these events raised 
doubts by both Republicans and Democrats about the 
presidency itself, and whether the president and the 
commander-in-chief could continue to be one person.(75)
The first crisis concerned the Viet Minh attack on 
French forces at Dien Bien Phu in 1954. President 
Eisenhower originally spoke of the event as the Korea of 
Indochina. On April 7th, he gave his famous "domino 
theory" speech, implying that a communist victory would 
lead to other communist victories in surrounding areas. He 
approved a National Security Council recommendation for 
limited U.S. intervention, but was publicly embarrassed 
when General Ridgway informed him that American troop 
strength and transport capability were inadequate for the 
task. Moreover, a call-up of national guard and reserve 
forces at least as large as the Korean build-up of 1950-51 
would be required even for a limited involvement.(75) The 
president's hesitation sent a message to the Viet Minh that 
the U.S. might not consider their attack to be such a high 
priority.
As open revolt broke out in Hungary in 1956, an 
opportunity to exercise U.S. policy again came about. With
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the threat of a full-scale nuclear confrontation with the 
USSR in the back of his mind, President Eisenhower again 
backed down from direct confrontation. Despite earlier 
encouragement for such rebellion through Radio Free Europe 
and other propaganda vehicles, the most the United States 
could offer the rebels was a word of support along with 
food and Red Cross supplies.(76)
October 4, 1957 brought the shocking news that the 
Soviets had launched the world's first satellite, Sputnik 
I. Immediately, superior Soviet capabilities in the rocket 
(and therefore nuclear delivery) business were evident.
The United States now had a questionable ability to carry 
out massive retaliation strategy even if it wanted to.
Middle Eastern crises returned in the summer of 1958. 
Egypt absorbed Syria, forming the United Arab Republic with 
the goal of uniting all Arab nations in the region. The 
U.S. feared the threat to the young nation of Israel and 
suspected Soviet assistance in the effort. (77)
Lebanon complained of border intrusions by the UAR 
designed to upset dissident groups and topple the Lebanese 
government. On July 16th, President Eisenhower ordered 
Marines into Lebanon without consulting Congress or 
referring to a 1957 resolution of support by the Congress. 
The Marines' goal was to protect the 2500 Americans in 
Lebanon and assist the Lebanese government in maintaining 
its sovereignty.
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The president explained,
I have come to the sober and clear conclusion that 
the action taken was essential to the welfare of 
the United States. It was required to support the 
principles of justice upon which peace and a stable 
international order depend.(78)
Similarly, the president single-handedly approved U-2 
overflights of the Soviet Union in order to gain 
intelligence information from aerial photography. In the 
spring of 1960, word of the overflights became public when 
Soviet air defenses shot down Francis Gary Powers who was 
flying a U-2 on a reconnaissance mission. Initially, the 
State Department and NASA issued statements that the 
shoot-down must have been a weather aircraft operating out 
of Turkey. They claimed the pilot must have suffered 
oxygen deficit loss of consciousness due to cabin pressure 
loss and strayed over Soviet territory when automatic 
systems took over.(79)
When Khrushchev announced the plane had crashed 1200 
miles inside Soviet borders near Sverdlovsk, administration 
credibility was damaged. In addition, the aircraft had 
been recovered and identified as a U-2 with reconnaissance 
camera equipment on board. The pilot also had been 
equipped with a poison "suicide needle," hardly standard 
issue for a weather mission.
Finally, the administration admitted the president had 
authorized the flights which had begun several years 
before. The details of each flight, however, had not been
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a presidential concern. In the June 6, 1960 State
Department Bulletin, the president explained,
It is part of my grave responsibility, within the 
overall problem of protecting the American people, to guard ourselves and our allies against surprise 
attack...as commander-in-chief, charged with the 
direction of the operations and activities of our 
armed forces and their supporting services, I take 
full responsibility for approving all the various 
programs undertaken by our government to secure and 
evaluate military intelligence.(80)
Despite these lone actions by the president acting as 
commander-in-chief, Eisenhower never really tried to expand 
his role as commander-in-chief. If anything, he attempted 
to temper the precedents set by Truman by asking for 
Congressional resolutions of support in most circumstances 
and by limiting the military budget to promote the general 
welfare of the economy.
The president's attempts, however, were just that.
The demands of the cold war and the increasing complexity 
of American responsibility around the world did increase 
the president's power to pursue foreign relations and act 
in the role of commander-in-chief. As Robinson points out, 
"the President himself, whether or not he wanted to be, had 
become a world leader."(81) Dealing with the inadequacies 
of massive retaliation strategy would fall upon the 
shoulders of the next administration.
If Congress was interested in maintaining its share of 
the war powers, it was strangely silent. Although the 
president had some difficulty adjusting to his increased
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responsibilities, the Congress lagged further behind in 
recognizing the new position of the United States in world 
leadership. This lag continued well into the Vietnam 
conflict and allowed for continuing expansion of power by 
the president as commander-in-chief.
CHAPTER IV. KENNEDY-THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS 
When Senator John F. Kennedy ran for president 
against Vice President Richard Nixon in I960, much of the 
Democratic position rested on the idea that the Eisenhower 
administration had been weak on defense issues. Kennedy 
pointed out the weaknesses in massive retaliation policy, 
showing that any challenge to American determination would 
have to be met with grave decisions about the fate of the 
civilized world unless the United States had some more 
flexible defense capabilities than nuclear weapons. The 
Kennedy administration, therefore took office calling for a 
new strategy, known as flexible response, where the United 
States would still be able to respond to aggression with 
nuclear weapons; but now we would also be able to respond 
to lesser acts of aggression in the Third World with 
conventional forces. This new strategy would require 
considerably larger defense forces than were in existence 
in 1960. While the buildup took place, Kennedy would have 
to deal with the weaknesses of massive retaliation 
strategy.
Perhaps the biggest challenge to American 
determination and the best example of the complexities of 
nuclear superpower relations is Kennedy's handling of the 
Cuban missile crisis. The details of this crisis make a 
case for strong presidential leadership and the inability 
of a large group (like Congress) to make important timely
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decisions concerning national defense. On the other hand, 
had the president handled the situation poorly, it would be 
just as easy to make the case that one person can not and 
should not be entrusted with ultimate war powers.
The missile crisis is important because it built 
Congressional and public confidence in the president's 
ability to act properly as the commander-in-chief without 
consulting Congress until the crisis was over. It is also 
unique because it is the first time that brinksmanship was 
truly put to the test. The seriousness of the modern 
president's commander-in-chief role was confirmed.
As Lester Brune points out, the success of deterrence 
depends on understanding how an enemy will act in a 
crisis.(82) With this in mind, it is helpful to look at 
the series of events leading up to the missile crisis of 
October, 1962. U.S. strategy was in a state of change and 
President Kennedy was underestimated by the Soviet 
leadership.
Remembering that JFK's presidential campaign rested on 
the idea that the Eisenhower administration had been weak 
on defense and reliant on an unrealistic strategy, it is 
easy to understand why Kennedy resorted to much more 
confrontational Cold War tactics once he took office. His 
ordering of the Bay of Pigs invasion as well as developing 
American policy in the Congo, Berlin, and Vietnam indicated 
Kennedy's willingness to be more aggressive with the
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Kremlin.(83) The administration program also included a 
healthy build-up of conventional military forces to offset 
the weaknesses of relying on strategic nuclear weapons.
In a special message to Congress on defense policies 
and principles on March 28, 1961, President Kennedy 
declared:
Our arms must be adequate to meet our commitments and 
insure our security, without being bound by arbitrary 
budget ceilings. This nation can afford to be strong- 
it cannot afford to be weak... Our strategic arms and 
defenses must be adequate to deter any deliberate 
nuclear attack on the United States or our allies- 
by making clear to any potential aggressor that 
sufficient retaliatory forces will be able to survive 
a first strike and penetrate his defenses in order to 
inflict unacceptable losses upon him... The strength and deployment of our forces in combination with 
those of our allies should be sufficiently powerful 
and mobile to prevent the steady erosion of the Free 
World through limited wars; and it is this role that 
should constitute the primary mission of our overseas 
forces... our objective now is to increase our ability 
to confine our response to non-nuclear weapons, and to 
lessen the incentive for any limited aggression by 
making clear what our response will accomplish.(84)
Kennedy's initial failure at the Bay of Pigs and his
failure to impress Chairman Khrushchev at their first
meeting led to a Soviet miscalculation of American
determination and capabilities. A complicating factor was
a differing definition of offensive and defensive nuclear
weapons between the U.S. and the Soviet Union.(83)
In early 1962, the Soviet Presidium decided to place
Medium Range and Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles
(MRBM/ICBM) in Cuba. Brune claims the decision was made in
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order to test Kennedy's will and protect Cuba against the 
threat of an American invasion.(85)
Meanwhile, the United States was still recovering from 
the idea of a "missile gap" which had become a popular 
notion after the 1957 Sputnik launch. President Eisenhower 
always maintained that no such gap existed, but his critics 
won out in the public opinion polls. Although the 
president was ultimately correct, and no missile gap ever 
really existed, his critics won by stating potential 
numbers of Soviet missiles rather than the numbers actually 
produced. Eisenhower also counted American strategic 
bombers in his evaluation while the missile gap proponents 
counted only numbers of ICBMs.
After taking office in early 1961, Kennedy quickly had 
access to Eisenhower's data and realized the missile gap 
really did not exist. We are left to wonder whether 
President Kennedy really already knew that no missile gap 
existed, but rode the tide of public opinion to attack the 
Eisenhower/Nixon record. Secret U-2 aerial photography 
indicated that the U.S. was still well ahead of the Soviets 
in strategic nuclear arms.(86) By late 1961, the president 
decided to publicly disclose the Soviet inadequacies.
It is now clear that Khrushchev wanted to make every 
effort to establish strategic parity with the United 
States. He was supported in that effort by S.S. Biryuzov, 
commander of the Soviet Strategic Rocket Forces. Biryuzov
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called for Cuban based missiles to offset a perceived 
first-strike capability by the United States.(87)
The U.S.S.R. steadily increased economic aid to Castro 
from 1960 to 1962. Khrushchev first suggested Soviet 
military protection for Cuba on July 9, 1962. He told 
Castro, "Soviet artillerymen can support the Cuban people 
with their rocket fire" and Soviet missiles could "land 
precisely on targets 13,000 kilometers away."(88) Later 
that month, Castro announced that the Soviets showed a new 
commitment to deter or repel a U.S. attack.
President Kennedy never agreed to abandon Cuba to 
communism. Falling back on the Monroe Doctrine, he said,
"I want it clearly understood that this government will not 
hesitate in meeting its primary obligations" to ensure the 
nation's security.(89)
On July 12th, Khrushchev made a statement that the 
Monroe Doctrine could no longer be valid, and that the 
United States was merely relying on an outdated concept to 
project its control over Latin America. Additionally, 
restrictions on Soviet activities in the western hemisphere 
were not balanced with similar restrictions on American 
activities in Europe.
By August, the Central Intelligence Agency, through 
U-2 overflights, had confirmed the presence of new 
Surface-to-Air missile sites in Cuba. The president chose 
not to act. Republican criticism from Congress immediately
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began to mount. Interestingly, the two parties had changed 
positions on who was "weak on defense."
By September 4th, the president felt the need to 
publicly answer the criticism from the minority party in 
Congress. Kennedy made statements on September 4th and 
September 13th claiming there was no evidence of Soviet 
offensive weapons in Cuba. Since SAMs were purely 
defensive in nature, the administration chose to do nothing 
while assuring the public and the Congress that it would be 
willing to do whatever was necessary to protect American 
security if offensive missiles were ever discovered.(90)
Also in early September, Secretary of State Dean Rusk 
convinced the Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance to stop 
flights over Cuba after China shot down a U-2 loaned to 
Formosa. He did not want to have a repeat of the Powers 
incident in Cuba. The Director of Central Intelligence was 
on his honeymoon at the time and therefore was not present 
to oppose the Secretary. As a result, no reconnaissance 
flights were flown over Cuba from September 10th until 
October 14th.
Upon his return, Director McCone directed resumption 
of U-2 overflights of Cuba. The first flight on October 
14th found evidence of Soviet missile site 
construction.(91)
McGeorge Bundy informed the president of the discovery 
of MRBM construction in Cuba early on the morning of
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Tuesday, October 16th. Kennedy immediately called for an 
11:45 am secret meeting of the Executive Committee of the 
National Security Council. Attendees were to be Vice 
President Johnson, Secretary of State Rush, Secretary of 
Defense McNamara, Attorney General Robert Kennedy, Generals 
Taylor and Carter, Roswell Gilpatric, George Ball, Edwin 
Martin, McGeorge Bundy, Ted Sorenson, Douglas Dillon, 
Ambassador Bohlen and Appointments Secretary Kenneth 
O'Donnell.(92) This first meeting dismissed the "do 
nothing" alternative as a nullification of the Monroe 
Doctrine and the Rio Treaty. The first decision would be 
an increase in U-2 activity and no public comment until a 
solution was chosen.
The president decided to maintain his normal schedule 
while allowing his brother, the Attorney General, to run 
the ExComm meetings. This would avoid the public 
perception that something out of the ordinary might be 
going on. Kennedy also recognized an important element of 
decision making. Since his presence might stifle creative 
thinking and pressure ExComm members to give the answer 
they felt the president wanted, the president decided not 
to attend many of the ExComm meetings. Even when he did 
attend, his brother claims he played the role of devil's 
advocate rather than taking a position.(93)
Elie Abel describes the first six options considered 
by the ExComm on October 17th. Three options were proposed
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by the diplomats and three were proposed by the military 
members. Track A was to take no immediate action. The 
administration would privately confront Andrei Gromyko with 
the U-2 photos.
Track B was to send an emissary to Khrushchev to 
privately demand removal of the Soviet missiles from Cuba. 
Track C would be to arraign the U.S.S.R. and Cuba before 
the United Nations Security Council.
Each of the three diplomatic proposals had weaknesses 
that led to their dismissal. Track A was rejected because 
it would give the Soviets advance warning before any public 
pressure could be brought to bear on them. Track B could 
be hazardous because it could be countered by a Soviet 
initiative similar to the Munich conference. Finally,
Track C was unacceptable because of Soviet veto power on 
the Security Council and the Soviets' turn to chair that 
body during the month of October.
The military proposals were labelled Tracks D, E, and 
F. Track D, favored strongly by Secretary of Defense 
McNamara, was an embargo and naval blockade of Cuba. This 
would be the "slow track" which could be selective and 
easily controlled in relation to an armed attack.
Track E was favored by Air Force generals and 
consisted of a pinpoint bombing attack on the missile 
sites. Concerns here included casualties, accuracy and
retaliation.
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Track F was the most drastic proposal— an all out 
invasion of Cuba. Problems with this proposal were the 
time needed to mount the offensive and the difficulty in 
concealing plans for such a large operation.(94)
On October 18th, the ExComm split into two "teams" to 
debate the only remaining options seen as realistic. The 
air strike and blockade options were sent through a war 
games type exercise to find weaknesses. By this time, new 
intelligence estimates indicated half of the current Soviet 
ICBH capacity being installed in Cuba.
McNamara advocated the blockade option because of its 
controllability and flexibility while Air Force Chief of 
Staff General Curtis LeMay pushed for a surgical air strike 
to eliminate the missiles before they could become a 
threat. His worry was that once operational capability was 
achieved, any misses in a later strike might result in 
instant nuclear retaliation against the United States. The 
president was called in at 10:00pm, and according to his 
brother, was initially in favor of the air strike 
option.(95)
President Kennedy was initially opposed by UN 
ambassador Stevenson who suggested giving up missiles in 
Turkey and Italy and the naval base at Guantanamo Bay in 
exchange for the Soviets removing the missiles from Cuba.
An interesting point is that the president had ordered the 
older missile systems removed from Turkey in the spring of
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1962, but bureaucratic inertia prevented their removal.
Now they appeared to be becoming an important bargaining 
chip with the Soviets.
Abel says,
The President alone, as Commander in Chief, had the 
power to decide and did in fact give the orders. The President's was the controlling intelligence. He ran 
the operation, one official recalls, "like a 
lieutenant runs a platoon in combat." Bundy, Rusk, 
Stevenson, and the rest were there to advise him. He 
listened, then made his own decisions.(96)
The ultimate policy objective was to remove the Soviet
missiles from Cuba or get rid of Castro. With the Bay of
Pigs humiliation in the back of his mind, the president
chose the blockade plan, with the option to carry out air
strikes or an invasion at a later date. Ted Sorenson was
assigned to write the president's announcement.
The final plan had seven steps. First was the naval
quarantine. It would not be like the 1948 Berlin Blockade
because only offensive weapons shipments would be turned
back.
The second step was continued close surveillance of 
activities on Cuba. Cubans and Soviets at the sites would 
be warned of possible danger from attack.
The U.S. would promise instant retaliation in the 
event of any launch of missiles from Cuba. This 
retaliation would be aimed at the Soviet homeland.
Next, Navy dependents were to be evacuated from 
Guantanamo Bay and the base was to be reinforced in case of
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hostile action by the Cubans. Diplomatic action would also 
be taken. The U.S. called a meeting of the Organization of 
American States to invoke the Rio Treaty.
The United States also called an emergency meeting of 
the United Nations Security Council to call for a 
resolution ordering the U.S.S.R. to dismantle and remove 
all offensive missiles from Cuba.
Lastly, there would be a personal appeal to reason.
The president would call on Chairman Khrushchev to support 
world peace.(97) The president went on national television 
the night of October 22nd to outline the plan for the 
American people and the world.(98) Before his speech, 
however, the president wrote a letter to Khrushchev which 
would become the first of a daily series of written 
communications between the two leaders.
The ExComm did address the question of the president's 
powers as commander-in-chief. It pondered the idea of 
calling on Congress to ask for a declaration of war on 
Cuba. Former Secretary of State Dean Acheson advised the 
president not to worry about legal formalities because 
American security was at stake. His advice sounds 
remarkably similar to the advice he gave President Truman 
after the North Korean invasion. This is a key point about 
how presidential war powers had evolved up until then. 
Acheson and all those who went along with his advice 
believed that the law did not apply to the president in
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times when the national security was at stake. As long as 
the president is making decisions that are publicly 
popular, this concept of presidential power might be fairly 
easy to accept. However, as the nation would find out by 
experiencing the next two presidents, the idea of 
unrestricted presidential power during emergencies sets a 
dangerous precedent for accumulation of personal power.
By basically sitting idle during the ever increasing number 
of national emergencies, Congress helped set the stage for 
the major conflict over the "imperial presidency" in the 
early 1970s.
President Kennedy apparently did reject all ideas of 
recalling Congress or asking for a declaration of war. He 
directed the blockade "acting under and by virtue of the 
authority conferred upon me by the Constitution and 
statutes of the United States Congress and the Organ of 
Consultation of the American Republics and to defend the 
security of the United States..."(99) The Congressional 
resolution Kennedy referred to was one passed in September, 
1962, calling for any means necessary to prevent Cuba from 
extending subversive activities throughout the western 
hemisphere or from creating or using any military capacity 
threatening to the United States.
The full cabinet and Congressional leaders were not 
informed of the complete plan until three hours before the 
president's television address. Some tension did develop
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among members of Congress, but overall, the response was 
supportive of the president. Senators Russell and 
Fulbright were not satisfied with the blockade and called 
for an invasion of Cuba. When Fulbright was questioned 
about how he could oppose the Bay of Pigs invasion yet 
favor an invasion now, he responded that the Bay of Pigs 
was not a critical event, but deployment of Soviet missiles 
was.
Representative Halleck represented the Republican 
minority point of view by stating that he supported the 
actions of the president but was disappointed that he was 
only informed, not consulted about U.S. military plans.
This viewpoint was expressed, but never very loudly with 
the threat of a nuclear war bearing more on the public mind 
than a constitutional issue.(100)
Answering later charges that Congressional 
consultation may have been necessary, President Kennedy 
answered,
We no longer live in a world where only the actual 
firing of weapons represents a sufficient challenge 
to a nation's security to constitute maximum peril. 
Nuclear weapons are so destructive and ballistic 
missiles are so swift that any substantially increased 
possibility of their use or any sudden change in their 
deployment may well be regarded as a definite threat to peace.(101)
The president seems to have been equating presidential 
action concerning nuclear weapons with an imminent threat 
to the people and/or property of the United States. If 
this is accepted as true, he was really doing nothing more
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than exercising presidential power recognized since the 
founding fathers. What really had changed was the concept 
of "imminent threat." With the minimum response time 
available under nuclear attach, the president could now 
argue that an imminent threat to the United States existed 
on a day to day basis. While his "list of powers" did not 
change much, the implications of presidential action 
regarding nuclear weapons and the frequency of such actions 
now gave the president opportunity to exercise war powers 
on a scale never imagined by the founding fathers.
At 7:00 am on Friday, October 26th, the U.S. Navy 
stopped and boarded the first vessel headed for Cuba. The 
vessel was the Marucla, an American built Liberty ship 
owned by Panama, registered in Lebanon, and bound for Cuba 
under Soviet charter. President Kennedy personally 
selected the Marucla as the first ship to be boarded 
because it wasn't Soviet owned. At this late hour he still 
tried to reduce the conflict by choosing a chartered 
vessel, but he felt it important to demonstrate American 
resolve. At 7:24 am, crewmen from the destroyers John 
Pierce and Joseph P. Kennedy, Jr. boarded the Marucla. 
found no weapons and encountered no problems with the 
vessel's crew.
The president ordered increased reconnaissance 
overflight activity. The sortie rate increased from two 
per day to one flight every one to two hours. This
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photographic information would be critical to the 
president's decision about whether or not to order an air 
strike on the missile sites.
Later Friday morning, President Kennedy ordered the 
State Department to prepare for an occupation government in 
case of an American invasion. Again, Secretary McNamara 
reminded him, "we should expect very heavy casualties in an 
invasion."(102)
Meanwhile, Secretary McNamara was leading the blockade
effort. According to Elie Abel,
Methodically the Secretary of Defense quizzed the 
Chief of Naval Operations about details— the kinds of 
details, Navy men insist, that civilians have no 
business worrying about. No Secretary of Defense had 
ever spoken that way to a member of the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff. He asked whether there was a Russian- 
speaking officer on each blockading destroyer.
Anderson confessed he did not know. Then find out, McNamara said. (In fact the Navy had foreseen this 
need and, among others, had assigned several Annapolis language instructors to blockade duty.) (103)
Attorney General Robert Kennedy pointed out that the
President felt compelled to supervise every detail. He was
concerned with medical personnel, electronic intelligence,
leaflet drops, and the ships to be used for the
invasion.(104) Apparently, the president felt his duties
as commander-in-chief required this attention to the many
details of the operation.
On October 25th, Walter Lippmann had appealed to
President Kennedy to trade American IRBM sites in Turkey
for the Soviet missile sites in Cuba. Lippmann argued
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these sites were defenseless and militarily unimportant to 
the United States. He stressed the need to continue 
diplomatic efforts despite initiation of military action.
He did not know that the president had already considered 
all these points and indeed was quietly pursuing diplomatic 
solutions through his daily correspondence with Chairman 
Khrushchev.
At 6:00pm on Friday evening, the 26th, Khrushchev's 
most revealing letter of the crisis arrived at the White 
House. Robert Kennedy points out that much has been 
written about this letter, but it was clearly a personal 
message from the chairman not written by Kremlin 
officials.(104) The letter was very long and focused on 
death and anarchy that would result from a nuclear 
exchange. Clearly, Kennedy's resolve was very real to 
Khrushchev.
Khrushchev sought to calm the president by assuring 
him that Soviet missiles in Cuba would never be used to 
attack the United States. They were present only for 
defensive purposes.
You can be calm in this regard, that we are of sound mind and understand perfectly well that if we attack 
you, you will respond the same way. But you too will 
receive the same that you hurl against us. And I 
think that you also understand this...This indicates 
that we are normal people, that we correctly understand and correctly evaluate the situation. 
Consequently, how can we permit the incorrect actions 
which you ascribe to us? Only lunatics or suicides, 
who themselves want to perish and to destroy the whole 
world before they die, could do this.
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We want something quite different...not to destroy 
your country...but despite our ideological differences, to compete peacefully, not by military 
means.(105)
Khrushchev also acknowledged that all planned missile 
shipments were already in Cuba, so there was no need to 
stop ships currently proceeding to Cuba. He explained that 
the USSR had placed them there because they felt a U.S. 
interest in overthrowing Castro. The missiles were merely 
a means to help the Castro government defend itself by 
providing a deterrent to an American invasion.
Khrushchev's proposal came down to this: The United 
States promises not to invade Cuba and withdraws the 
blockade in exchange for the removal or destruction of 
missiles in Cuba and the curtailment of any further missile 
shipments to Cuba from the Soviet Union.
Developments came rapidly the morning of Saturday 
October 27th. FBI director J. Edgar Hoover submitted a 
report to the president indicating Soviet personnel in New 
York were destroying sensitive documents in preparation for 
war. A second letter from Khrushchev arrived with a much 
more formal tone. Obviously, this letter had been prepared 
by other Kremlin officials. It included a demand that 
American missiles in Turkey be removed in exchange for 
Soviet missiles in Cuba.
The Attorney General reports that the ExComm met again 
to consider the Soviet proposal. Although the president 
was angry about his earlier orders to remove missiles from
75
Turkey being ignored, the ExComm found the Soviet offer 
reasonable with no projected loss to U.S. or NATO 
capabilities.(106)
Later that morning, word reached the president that 
Major Rudolf Anderson, Jr. was shot down and killed by a 
Soviet surface-to-air missile while on a U-2 reconnaissance 
mission over Cuba. President Kennedy expressed concern 
about further U-2 flights with the continued SAM threat. 
Despite his concern, the president restrained his call for 
an attack.
It is isn't the first step that concerns me, but both sides escalating to the fourth and fifth step— and we 
don't go to the sixth because there is no one around 
to do so. We must remind ourselves we are embarking 
on a very hazardous course.
He also was worried about other parts of the world. His 
next question was whether areas like Berlin or Turkey 
should be notified of a potential war.(107)
Robert Kennedy remembered,
These hourly decisions, necessarily made with such 
rapidity, could be made only by the President of the 
United states, but any one of them might close and 
lock doors for people and governments in many other 
lands. We had to be aware of this responsibility at all times, he said, aware that we were deciding, the 
President was deciding, for the U.S., the Soviet Union, Turkey, NATO, and really for all mankind...(107)
President Kennedy decided to try one more letter to 
Khrushchev. The State Department's draft bluntly said "no 
trades," but the Attorney General and Ted Sorenson believed 
the State Department's tone was too harsh. They encouraged
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the president to accept the Soviet offer as it did not 
damage American security and achieved our policy 
objectives. At the president's request, Kennedy and 
Sorenson drew up an alternate response. Their version 
provided general acceptance of the Soviet proposal, but did 
not directly offer to remove U.S. missiles from Turkey.
This allowed the president to compromise with Khrushchev 
without appearing to have backed down. President Kennedy 
accepted the alternate response and signed the text.
On Sunday, October 28th, the president issued a public 
statement.
I welcome Chairman Khrushchev's statesmanlike decision 
to stop building bases in Cuba, dismantling offensive 
weapons and returning them to the Soviet Union under 
United Nations verification. This is an important and 
constructive contribution to peace.
We shall be in touch with the Secretary-General of the 
United Nations with respect to reciprocal measures to 
assure peace in the Caribbean area.
It is my earnest hope that the governments of the 
world can, with a solution of the Cuban crisis, turn 
their attention to the compelling necessity for ending 
the arms race and reducing world tensions. This 
applies to the military confrontation between the 
Warsaw Pact and NATO countries as well as to other situations in other parts of the world where tensions 
lead to the wasteful diversion of resources to weapons 
of war.(108)
Because the president was killed a year after the 
Cuban missile crisis, he had little chance to reflect on 
the lessons learned from it. In an address at American 
University in Washington, D.C. on June 10, 1963, President 
Kennedy said,
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Above all, while defending our own vital interests, 
nuclear powers must avert those confrontations which bring an adversary to the choice of either a humiliating retreat or a nuclear war.(109)
In his memoirs, Robert Kennedy reflected at length
about the lessons of the Cuban missile crisis. He
summarizes the key lesson as providing enough time for a
variety of departmental interests to work in private to
develop a realistic set of options for the president. An
important corollary is to avoid too much respect and awe
for the president. Often subordinates are more concerned
with what the leader wants to hear than they are with the
best solution to the problem.
In this case, President Kennedy went to extraordinary
lengths to avoid insulation from ideas because of some
notion of rank or position. He also allowed the ExComm to
work without him to avoid his own influence on their
decision making. However, in the end, the president
realized his responsibility as commander-in-chief to make
the final decision.
I think this was more necessary in the military field 
than any other. President Kennedy was impressed with the effort and dedicated manner in which the military 
responded— the Navy deploying its vessels into the 
Caribbean; the Air Force going on continuous alert; 
the Army and Marines moving their soldiers and 
equipment into the southeastern part of the U.S.; and all of them alert and ready for combat.
But he was distressed that the representatives with 
whom he met, with the notable exception of General 
Taylor, seemed to give so little consideration to the implications of steps they suggested.(110)
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While Kennedy concluded an important need existed for 
civilian control over those dedicating their lives to 
waging war, he did express a larger fear for those few 
generals who always sought to avoid military action. In 
the president's view, generals and admirals should always 
advocate military solutions. This provides one side of the 
argument needed for good decision making. Perhaps he would 
liked to have talked with President Lincoln about his 
experiences with McClellan and the Army of the Potomac.
The handling of the Cuban missile crisis was certainly 
a success for President Kennedy. It does point out the 
need to have one solid decision maker in the midst of a 
national security crisis. It also illustrated the point 
that imminent danger to national security exists in day to 
day activities when large nuclear arsenals are present. A 
lack of congressional involvement in such a situation was 
not unusual, but the day to day presence of nuclear weapons 
provides more opportunities for the president to act alone 
as the commander-in-chief.
CHAPTER V. JOHNSON-THE GULF OF TONKIN RESOLUTION
Through the early 1960s, we have seen the development 
of the president's commander-in-chief role in terms of a 
new concept of limited war, national strategy with a 
monopoly on strategic nuclear weapons, and confrontation 
with a nuclear enemy approaching parity. All of these 
situations reflect a general reluctance on the part of 
Congress to interfere with an increasing presence by the 
chief executive as commander-in-chief.
The Johnson administration reflects a continuation of 
a trend of increasing presidential power, but provides a 
case indicating the beginnings of congressional opposition 
to this power. The Gulf of Tonkin Resolution represents 
many aspects of the Johnson presidency. It indicates a 
congressional trust in the judgment of the president with 
respect to war making, justification of massive build-up of 
American involvement in Vietnam, and the beginning of a 
movement to reassert the power of Congress with respect to 
the war powers, culminating in the War Powers Resolution of 
1973 during the Nixon administration.
When Lyndon Johnson took office in 1963, nearly 17,000 
American troops were in Vietnam, most in an advisory 
capacity. American involvement in the region began as long 
ago as the Truman administration, when 35 American advisers 
were sent. By the end of the Eisenhower years, about 100 
military advisers were in South Vietnam playing a small
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part in resisting the Viet Minh, a role abandoned by the 
French in 1954. A rapid build-up occurred during the 
Kennedy administration when the president viewed American 
military involvement as critical to the survival of South 
Vietnam.
As with most domestic and foreign aspects of the 
Johnson presidency, the war in Vietnam became an expansion 
of what began under President Kennedy. The war would 
become America's longest war, and one of its most costly. 
Only World War II cost more money, and only the Civil War 
and the two world wars cost more American lives. One might 
wonder, then, why no formal declaration of war was ever 
forthcoming from the Congress.(Ill)
Post-World War II experience seemed to indicate the 
president no longer needed a declaration of war from 
Congress to commit American troops to action. The Johnson 
administration maintained the position that "while any 
formal support that Congress might wish to extend in a 
given instance would be welcomed, the independent power of 
the executive was sufficient."(112)
Johnson's Undersecretary of State Katzenbach went so 
far as to state that since war was outlawed by the United 
Nations Charter, and armed force was only allowed in 
self-defense or in response to UN action, the concept of 
declarations of war had lost all international 
significance.(Ill)
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Harold Hyman claims that Johnson and presidents after 
him have misread presidential war powers history.(113) He 
cites the various examples where presidents have used 
military forces without a declaration of war and compares 
it to the situation in Vietnam in 1964. Where previous 
cases were either sanctioned by the United Nations or dealt 
with threats to American security or the lives of 
significant numbers of American citizens abroad, the United 
States had only a small number of advisers threatened in 
Vietnam in 1964. Although Hyman believes a constitutional 
requirement existed for congressional support of LBJ's 
Vietnam policy, he acknowledges that even if such a 
requirement did not exist, some politically strong sanction 
was necessary to enlarge the U.S. presence in the region.
The events leading up to the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution 
illustrate the presidential war powers already being 
exercised by Johnson in 1964. By the summer of 1964, the 
U.S. Navy was conducting so-called DeSoto patrols as part 
of a covert operation known as 34A. Operation 34A's 
purpose was to advise, train and assist South Vietnamese 
naval forces in interdicting North Vietnamese vessels.(114)
The DeSoto patrols were coastal reconnaissance 
missions aimed at investigating enemy naval potential.
They were generally carried out by U.S. Navy destroyers 
carrying "COMVAN" equipment and extra crewmen. Their 
mission was to collect information on water depth and
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temperature, navigation lights and buoys, currents and tide 
patterns. Patrols also observed maritime traffic for 
evidence of military activity. "COMVAN" equipment was used 
to identify radar transmitters, plot their locations, 
estimate effective ranges, and record emissions.
Finally, coastline photographs were taken to identify 
prominent landmarks, military installations, and new 
construction. All of this information was intended to help 
the South Vietnamese counter any North Vietnamese naval 
strategies.(115)
On July 30-31, 1964, the South Vietnamese navy shelled 
the North Vietnamese islands of Hon Me and Hon Ngu, 
approximately three miles from the mainland. By July 31, 
the U.S. destroyer Maddox was patrolling the Tonkin Gulf 
area where these islands are located. The Navy claims the 
Maddox entered the gulf to stimulate and monitor North 
Vietnamese and Chinese radars.(116)
While on patrol approximately 30 miles from the 
mainland on August 2nd, the Maddox intercepted emissions 
indicating potentially hostile intentions by North 
Vietnamese patrol boats. A message was dispatched to 
Admiral Sharp's headquarters in Hawaii describing the 
intelligence. The Admiral ordered resumption of 
surveillance when the captain of the Maddox deemed it 
"prudent."
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At li:00am and 2:40pm the Maddox changed course to 
avoid three North Vietnamese patrol boats it identified on 
radar. The destroyer radioed the aircraft carrier 
Ticonderoqa that it would fire in self-defense if 
necessary. According to the captain's log, the Maddox 
fired six salvos before the North Vietnamese returned 
fire.(117) Secretary of Defense McNamara testified before 
Congress that the first three shots were warning shots 
fired by the destoyer's five inch guns. Weapons officer 
Lieutenant Raymond Connell later told a reporter that all 
shots fired were aimed at the enemy.
The Ticonderoqa launched four Crusader aircraft to 
assist. Following a 21 minute battle, the aircraft 
reported two vessels damaged and one dead in the water with 
no personnel injuries or equipment damage to U.S. Navy 
assets.
The North Vietnamese promptly publicized the August 
2nd engagement, claiming their patrol boats "drove the 
intruder out of Vietnamese waters" and shot down two U.S. 
aircraft.(118) What happened over the next two days is 
less clear.
On August 3 and 4, the South Vietnamese attacked two 
points on the North Vietnamese mainland. Believing the 
United States directly participated in the shelling, the 
North Vietnamese protested. The Johnson administration
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stated publicly that there was no American participation in 
the shelling.
During the afternoon and evening of August 4th, the 
Maddox was cruising in rough seas about 65 nautical miles 
from the Vietnamese mainland. At 7:40pm/ five surface 
radar contacts were recorded approximately 36 miles 
northeast of the Maddox, identified as probable North 
Vietnamese torpedo boats. An interesting note is that the 
normal range of the radar carried on board the Maddox was 
20-25 miles, with longer ranges possible with degraded 
reliability due to ducting.
At 8:36pm, the Maddox radar identified two surface 
vessels and three aircraft. The Ticonderoqa immediately 
launched fighter cover to protect destroyers in the area. 
The Maddox then lost the three aircraft contacts from its 
radar. At 9:30, additional unidentified vessels were shown 
closing at speeds in excess of 40 knots. At this point, 
the Maddox reported hostile intentions by the radar 
contacts. At a range of 8000 yards, the Maddox 
unsuccessfully fired star shells in an attempt to light the 
target for visual identification. As the targets closed to 
6000 yards, the destroyer C. Turner Joy opened fire. The 
Maddox was now unable to locate the targets on radar.
The crew reported dodging a number of torpedos and sinking 
two attacking boats. The C. Turner Joy also reported
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being fired on by automatic weapons while being illuminated 
by searchlights.(119)
Just as promptly as they had publicized the first
incident, the North Vietnamese denied any engagement on
August 4th. The captain of the Maddox reported the
incident to Admiral Sharp, who contacted Secretary
McNamara. Despite doubts expressed by Admiral Sharp,
President Johnson ordered retaliatory airstrikes against
North Vietnam at 6:07am on August 5th.
Before the ships involved could answer inquiries for
facts, President Johnson went on television to announce
retaliatory action. McNamara ordered 64 airstrikes at four
patrol boat bases and a major oil depot. Bomb damage
reporting indicated that 10% of North Vietnam's patrol boat
storage was up to 90% destroyed.(120) Two U.S. planes were
destroyed and two were damaged in the attack.
Fifteen minutes after the president ordered the
strike, he called in 16 Congressional leaders for a 90
minute briefing about the incident. According to
Republican leader Everett Dirksen,
The whole case was laid on the table by the President, 
by the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, by the Secretary of Defense, and by the Secretary of 
State. Thereafter, there was no limit on the amount of discussion or on the questions that any member of 
the joint leadership from both the House and Senate 
might have wished to propound, whether they were 
addressed to the Secretaries or to the President.(121)
As he requested in his television address, LBJ had
asked the Congressional leaders for a resolution "making it
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clear that our government is united in its determination to 
take all necessary measures in support of freedom and in 
defense of peace in Southeast Asia."(122) Records show 
that all 16 Congressional leaders supported such a 
resolution and none felt it was significant that they were 
consulted after the attack was ordered.
In the House of Representatives, Robert W. Kastenmeir 
suggested a "haunting suspicion" that Congress was about 
to "endorse, as it did in 1898 (after the sinking of the 
USS Maine), a disproportionate response to a limited and 
ambiguous challenge."(123) Nevertheless, he voted for 
the Tonkin Gulf Resolution.
During debate on the resolution, Senator Wayne Morse 
of Oregon dared to dissent from the popular position. He 
stated his belief that electronic espionage by the Maddox 
done so close to South Vietnamese attacks, both in location 
and time, could not help but be seen as provocation by the 
North Vietnamese.
On August 6th, Senators Cooper and Fulbright debated 
the long term effects of the resolution on presidential war 
powers on the Senate floor:
Cooper- Are we now giving the President advance authority 
to take whatever action he may deem necessary respecting 
South Viet Nam and its defense, or with regard to the 
defense of any other country included in the (SEATO) 
treaty?
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Fulbright- Correct.
Cooper- ...looking ahead, the President decided that it was 
necessary to use such force as could lead into war, will we 
give that authority by this resolution?
Fulbright- That is the way I would interpret it. If a 
situation later developed in which we thought the approval 
should be withdrawn, it could be withdrawn by concurrent 
resolution.(124)
Fulbright went on to argue that the speed of modern warfare
requires anticipation of events. In other words, Congress
can not react quickly enough to allow for military
effectiveness. He also implied the president did not need
to consult with the Joint Chiefs of Staff or the Congress
under the terms of the resolution.
The Tonkin Gulf Resolution passed the House 416-0 and
the Senate 88-2 on August 10, 1964. It stated,
the Congress approves and supports the determination 
of the President, as Commander-in-Chief, to take all 
necessary measures to repel any armed attack against 
the forces of the United States and to prevent further 
aggression...consonant with the Constitution of the United states...the United States is therefore 
prepared, as the President determines, to take the 
necessary steps, including the use of armed force, to 
assist any member or protocol state (of the SEATO) 
requesting assistance in the defense of its freedom.(Ill)
Although repelling armed attack had historically been 
recognized as a presidential war power, the resolution 
allowing the president to determine the necessary steps to
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defend the freedom of allies seems to pass up Congressional 
authority over war making.
The Johnson administration certainly interpreted the 
resolution as a broad grant of power. In testimony before 
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on August 17, 1967, 
Under Secretary of State Nicholas de B. Katzenbach called 
the Tonkin Gulf Resolution the "functional equivalent" of a 
declaration of war.(125)
The dangers of such a broad grant of power by Congress 
to the president quickly became evident. The North 
Vietnamese claimed a Johnson fabrication the day of the 
second gulf incident. In a "Memorandum Regarding the U.S. 
War Acts Against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam in the 
First Days of August 1964," Hanoi's Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs said,
This is an imprudent fabrication inasmuch as in the 
day and night of August 4, 1964, no naval craft of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam was present in the area 
where the U.S. destroyers were allegedly "attacked for 
a second time by North Vietnamese PT boats." The 
alleged attack was deliberately staged by the United States to have a pretext for carrying out its criminal 
designs against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.
According to reports from various sources, a task 
group of the Seventh Fleet including the aircraft carrier Ticonderoga and the destroyers Berkeley,
Edson, Harry Hubbard, and Samuel Moore were cruising 
on a permanent basis in the South China Sea off Da 
Nang. On August 4, 1964, the Harry Hubbard met with 
the HQ609 and HQ11 of the South Vietnamese navy 60 
kilometers off Da Nang. Thereafter, the South 
Vietnamese ships did not return to their base...as 
usual. In the same night, from 2000 to 2200, at 
about the time when "North Vietnamese PT boats" 
allegedly "attacked the Maddox and the Turner Joy" gun 
shelling was heard, flares and planes were seen
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off the shores of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam 
on international waters.
That is what the Pentagon termed the "second 
deliberate attack" on the destroyers Maddox and Turner 
Joy, or the "second Tonkin Gulf incident."(126)
Subsequent investigation by Congressional committees
and Pentagon officials fueled doubt that the second
incident had actually taken place. To begin with, August
weather conditions in the Tonkin Gulf are extremely
turbulent. On the night of August 4th the Maddox was
encountering rough seas due to thunderstorms. The Maddox
was encountering sonar malfunctions as well as atmospheric
interference with her radar system. Technicians later
testified that false returns caused by weather, high seas,
or propeller action were not only possible, but likely.
At approximately 8:00pm, the Maddox intercepted North
Vietnamese radio transmissions which gave Captain John
Herrick the impression that patrol boats were preparing for
action. The actual transcripts of these messages remain
classified today due to the intelligence sources used to
collect them. When the Ticonderoqa sent air support
responding to Herrick's request, the eight Crusader jets
found no evidence of enemy naval activity.(127)
Automatic weapons fire reported by the C. Turner Jov
turned out to be the Maddox's anti-aircraft barrage fired
at erroneous radar targets. While the C. Turner Joy
located a number of enemy vessels on radar, the Maddox was
unable to confirm any radar targets due to malfunctions.
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Similarly, the Maddox identified 22 torpedo shots on sonar, 
none of which was seen by the C. Turner Joy's sonar men.
As Galloway points out, North Vietnamese patrol boats carry 
only two torpedos, so 11 boats would have had to be 
present. No evidence exists to support such a claim.(128) 
Captain Herrick would later testify that the false sonar 
targets probably resulted from his own screw beats from 
evasive maneuvering.
Even as early as the hours following disengagement 
from the alleged attack, Captain Herrick and the men of the 
Maddox began to doubt some of the details of what had just 
happened. In an immediate message to Admiral Sharp in 
Hawaii, Herrick said the "entire action leaves many doubts" 
and that a "thorough reconnaissance in daylight" by 
aircraft would be necessary to confirm the accuracy of 
initial reports.(129)
Despite awareness of these reports by Secretary 
McNamara and a call by him to Admiral Sharp stating that 
retaliation could not be justified "unless we are damned 
sure what happened," political momentum already had caused 
the president to act. The question remains whether 
President Johnson created that momentum to justify his 
actions or the momentum already established forced him to 
act. By the time anyone was able to sort out what actually 
happened, the decisions had been made and the retaliatory 
airstrikes had been carried out.
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By early 1965, even the president had significant 
doubts about whether a second incident had ever occurred.
He told a close aide that reports of the incidents were 
merely an example "of what I have to put up with" at the 
Pentagon. He added, "For all I know, our Navy was shooting 
at whales out there."(130) Current evidence indicates that 
Navy communications and reports were working as designed, 
but the president's political need for a Congressional 
resolution of support and an impulsive decision were more 
the cause of his problems.
Added support for the skepticism came on July 1, 1966 
when the U.S. Navy captured a North Vietnamese patrol boat 
division commander whom they described as "cooperative and 
reliable." The prisoner reported extensively on the attack 
of August 2nd, but claimed to know nothing of any activity 
on the 4th. His claims were backed up by the stories of 
other prisoners of war.(131)
Whether or not the second incident ever took place, 
the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution definitely became Johnson's 
justification for escalation of the war in Vietnam. By the 
end of 1965, 181,382 more American troops had been sent to 
southeast Asia with over 500,000 eventually arriving in the 
region. In addition, President Johnson ordered the 
systematic bombing of North Vietnam on February 7, 1965, 
explaining that there would be no more "tit for tat."
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In September, 1965, the Lawyers Committee on American 
Policy Toward Viet Nam issued a statement on the 
president's actions since the Gulf of Tonkin incident.
They claimed that Johnson administration policies were 
contrary to international law and the U.S. Constitution.
A March 4, 1966 State Department White Paper titled 
"The Legality of United States Participation in the Defense 
of Viet Nam" claimed that without a declaration of war, the 
president could commit combat troops acting as the 
commander-in-chief, a party to the SEATO treaty, and by 
consent of the Congress outlined in the Tonkin Gulf 
Resolution. An interesting observation becomes clear.
In every case we have studied since World War II, treaty 
commitments were a significant argument justifying lone 
presidential action. In the Truman case, participation in 
the United Nations was a justification for the Korean War. 
In the Eisenhower and Kennedy cases, widespread commitments 
to mutual defense treaties where the U.S. acted as a 
"nuclear umbrella" were important contributors to decision 
making by the president.
In this case, the Johnson administration relied 
largely on Article IV paragraph 1 of the SEATO treaty which 
said in case of armed attack, each member would "meet the 
common danger in accordance with its constitutional 
processes."(132) Obviously, the Johnson administration's 
entire justification for escalation in Vietnam had to rely
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on the commander-in-chief powers unless the Gulf of Tonkin 
Resolution could add to the argument.
As Rossiter explains,
The central paradox of the Johnson administration's 
response to the Tonkin Gulf resolution was that, while 
the administration requested the resolution and 
employed it openly as the justification for the use 
of armed forces in Asia, the administration also 
declared that the resolution was not necessary.(133)
It is hard to believe that President Johnson truly felt he
did not need the resolution to justify expansion of the
Vietnam war. In a news conference on August 18, 1967, he
said,
We stated then, and we repeat now, we did not think 
the resolution was necessary to do what we did and 
what we are doing. But we thought it desirable. We 
thought if we were going to ask them to stay the whole 
route, and if we expected them to be there on the 
landing we ought to ask them to be there on the take 
off.(134)
By this time, Fulbright and other Senators came to 
regret the resolution and began to call for limits on the 
president and an investigation of the Tonkin Gulf affair. 
The Senate Foreign Relations Committee conducted the 
investigation and found that Secretary McNamara had misled 
the committee by not telling "how increasingly ambiguous 
the reports of the second incident became as the hours wore 
on. What he described in such positive terms was actually 
a highly confused event."(135)
By March 8, 1968, the investigation was complete and 
Senator Fulbright commented,
Insofar as the consent of this body is said to derive
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from the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, it can only be 
said that the resolution, like any other contract 
based on misrepresentation, in my opinion, is null 
and void.(136)
Repeal of the resolution would eventually come. Public 
dissatisfaction with the war and more reports of 
misrepresentation would finally cause the Congress to act 
in order to "take back" some of the war making powers it 
had handed over to the president since World War II.
Lyndon Johnson had been able to expand presidential 
commander-in-chief powers to new extremes, but that same 
expansion of power became his political downfall. The next 
president would have to wrestle with the Congress over 
appropriate uses of presidential war powers.
CHAPTER VI. NIXON-CAMBODIA AND THE WAR POWERS ACT
Throughout 1967 and 1968, a variety of factors 
combined to increase the disillusionment of many in the 
United States about the Johnson administration's Vietnam 
policy. By early 1968, public opinion so strongly opposed 
the president that he elected not to run for reelection. 
Although all the precedent and policy machinery was already 
in place to continue the war in Vietnam, Richard Nixon 
entered the White House in 1969 with a different set of 
pressures affecting his Vietnam policy. Clearly, 
significant pressure existed to end U.S. involvement and 
bring the troops home. On the other hand, American foreign 
policy concerns about southeast Asia had not really 
changed, and the Nixon administration still felt a need to 
support the efforts of the South Vietnamese against 
Communism.
Richard Nixon's expansion of the war into Cambodia 
provides an illustration of the ultimate in presidential 
war powers. Never before had a U.S. president secretly 
arranged to go to war against another country without 
consulting more than a handful of close personal advisors. 
Not only were the arrangements secret, but the actual 
conduct of the war remained secret for quite some time. 
While relying on post-World War II precedent and the 
commander-in-chief clause of the Constitution, the Nixon 
administration carried on the last uninhibited war from the
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White House. Reaction to this war would finally bring
about the reassertion of power by the Congress through the
War Powers Act of 1973. All subsequent presidents, while
denying the constitutional basis for the War Powers Act,
would basically comply with its provisions.
President Nixon did not rely on the same rationale as
President Johnson to justify his actions in southeast Asia.
The administration quickly silenced any reliance on the
SEATO treaty voiced by Johnson's people. This change was
based on arguments by Nixon's advisors that actions based
on SEATO agreements were shaky at best.
The North Vietnamese were quick to test the new
president. In February, 1969, small scale offensives were
launched which relied on troop and equipment sanctuaries
located just inside Cambodia. Prince Norodom Sihanouk of
Cambodia loudly proclaimed his country's neutrality in an
attempt to protect Cambodian sovereignty.
We are a country caught between the hammer and the 
anvil, a country that would very much like to 
remain the last haven of peace in Southeast Asia.(137)
To protect his sovereignty from stronger North Vietnamese
military incursions into his territory, Prince Sihanouk had
granted President Johnson the right of "hot pursuit" in
December, 1967. In other words, U.S. forces could pursue
fleeing Viet Cong and North Vietnamese troops into Cambodia
to eliminate their sanctuaries. Johnson had rejected the
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idea because he was reluctant to expand an already 
unpopular war.
General Earle G. Wheeler, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, brought the issue up again to the new president.
Nixon recalls his reaction to the North Vietnamese attacks.
My immediate instinct was to retaliate. Kissinger and 
I agreed that if we let the Communists manipulate us 
at this early stage, we might never be able to 
negotiate with them from a position of equality, much 
less one of strength. Johnson had made this mistake 
and had never been able to recover the 
initiative.(138)
General Creighton Abrams, commander of U.S. forces in 
South Vietnam called General Wheeler on February 9th to 
inform him that photographic intelligence confirmed the 
Central Office for South Vietnam or COSVN in Base Area 353, 
one of the suspected sanctuary areas inside Cambodia.
COSVN was allegedly a North Vietnamese and Viet Cong 
headquarters established to direct the war effort in South 
Vietnam. Up until this time, COSVN had been reported 
located inside Laos. Abrams requested an attack on COSVN.
General Abrams called for "a short-duration, 
concentrated B-52 attack of up to 60 sorties, compressing 
the time interval between strikes to the minimum. This is 
more than we would normally use to cover a target of this 
size, but in this case it would be wise to insure complete 
destruction."(139) The objective was to damage the enemy's 
offensive capability in order to allow for the withdrawal 
of U.S. ground troops from South Vietnam.
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Abrams argued that there was little chance of inciting 
Cambodian reaction since the B-52s would only be over 
Cambodian airspace for about one minute. In addition, the 
sanctuaries were supposedly located in sparsely populated 
areas, so the chance of civilian casualties was low.
The Joint Chiefs forwarded the message to Secretary of 
Defense Melvin Laird, then on to National Security Advisor 
Henry Kissinger and President Nixon. Abrams reportedly did 
not expect much to come of his suggestion, and was 
encouraged when the Joint Chiefs of Staff told him to make 
a tentative plan for an attack early on March 18th.
The Central Intelligence Agency did not strongly 
support General Abrams' and defense intelligence's 
estimates concerning the COSVN. In a report to the 
president, the CIA still expected the Ho Chi Minh Trail in 
Laos was logistically more important to the enemy effort 
than the Cambodian sanctuaries.(140)
Some historical background is helpful to understand 
the decision that faced President Nixon. Since he came to 
power in 1955, Prince Sihanouk's primary ambition was to 
preserve Cambodia's independence from foreign powers. 
National survival was always his major political issue. To 
ensure this survival, Sihanouk pursued a "policy of extreme 
neutrality" playing off his neighbors against each 
other.(141) Richard Nixon met Prince Sihanouk while 
serving as Vice President under Eisenhower. His initial
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impression of Sihanouk as "troublesome" lasted through his 
time as president.
In 1958, South Vietnam violated the Cambodian border 
several times in pursuit of enemy forces. While the U.S. 
supported the South Vietnamese in this endeavor, Sihanouk 
developed diplomatic relations with China to counter the 
South Vietnamese threat to Cambodian sovereignty.
A 1959 Department of Defense study titled, 
"Psychological Operations: Cambodia" attempted to find 
"effective" groups in Cambodian society who might be 
subject to American pressure. The study concluded the 
Cambodian people were "by and large a docile passive 
people. They cannot be counted on to act in any positive 
way for the benefit of U.S. aims and policies."(142) The 
Pentagon suggested the best possibilities for support were 
with the middle class urban elite and the military officer 
corps. Interestingly, these two groups were instrumental 
in Sihanouk's overthrow in 1970.
American aid provided 14% of annual revenues and 30% 
of the Cambodian military budget by 1963. In the eyes of 
the middle class, this U.S. money provided the only chance 
for economic and social progress. American military money 
did buy friends in the Cambodian officer corps, but a 
provision of U.S. law insulted Prince Sihanouk. According 
to military aid law, Americans had to inspect the "end use" 
of U.S. military equipment sold abroad to be sure it was
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not being sold to communist forces. Sihanouk saw such an 
intrusion as another threat to his independence.
In 1963, Sihanouk publicly announced his belief that 
the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong would eventually triumph 
over South Vietnamese and American forces. His dislike for 
the American arms arrangement and an increasing reliance by 
the Cambodian military on American aid caused him to 
renounce all American aid agreements and send all U.S. 
military aid missions home.
Reporting on his last call to Cambodian Minister of 
Defense Lon Nol, General Taber, head of the U.S. military 
aid mission said,
Lon Nol's friendliness was apparently genuine and his 
indirect placing of responsibility on Sihanouk for the 
termination of U.S. aid, as well as his assurance that 
Cambodia will never voluntarily become a communist 
country imply the possibility that there is a point beyond which the military will refuse to support the Chief of State.(143)
It would take six more years before General Taber's 
prediction would come true.
Newsweek contributed to Prince Sihanouk's displeasure 
with the United States in 1965 when it published an article 
attacking him and his family for enjoying the profits from 
a brothel business. This article, coupled with the first 
deployment of American combat troops to South Vietnam, 
resulted in a break in diplomatic relations between the 
Prince's government and the United States.
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Although Sihanouk did not particularly like the 
communists any more than he did the United States, American 
strategy in the Vietnam war directly affected foreign 
incursions on Cambodian territory. Throughout 1965,
General Westmoreland ordered search and destroy missions 
pushing in from the Vietnamese coast to eliminate enemy 
strongholds and supply lines. The U.S. Navy also 
established a coastal blockade to strangle sea lines of 
supply and communication.
Sihanouk elected to allow sanctuaries for communist 
forces in Cambodia's eastern provinces. This was largely 
done out of a fear of the communists' military might. 
Meanwhile, the Viet Cong established the Ho Chi Minh Trail 
through Laos and northeast Cambodia to keep supply lines 
safe from American interdiction efforts.
In 1966, Chou En-lai asked the prince for the use of 
the port of Sihanoukville to ship supplies to the Viet 
Cong. Sihanouk agreed to the arrangement because he would 
receive 1/3 of all supplies shipped for his own country.
The Central Intelligence Agency was aware of the agreement, 
but minimized its importance in reports to the president. 
The Nixon administration commissioned its own study in 1969 
and found that five times the amount of supplies indicated 
in CIA reports were being shipped through Sihanoukville to 
the enemy. Later findings would support the Nixon 
figures.(144)
102
President Johnson ordered special forces and the CIA 
to recruit mercenaries from eastern Cambodia to disrupt the 
sanctuaries in 1967. Without notifying Congress, LBJ 
ordered clandestine reconnaissance and sabotage missions 
code-named Salem House into Cambodia to interrupt supply 
shipments. These missions would later be known as Daniel 
Boone missions. In all, 1835 missions were carried out 
over the next four years.
Expanding U.S. activity in South Vietnam forced the 
communists west into Cambodia, but Prince Sihanouk's 
military had deteriorated since 1963 because of the cut-off 
in U.S. aid. He found himself unable to counter the 
communists on Cambodian soil. Sihanouk began to fear the 
communists and made a political shift calling for more 
right wing officials in government. Lon Nol moved up to 
the Prime Ministry. Although the mood was more 
pro-American, the goal was still to play the foreigners 
against each other.
According to the Nixon administration, Sihanouk 
contacted the U.S. ambassador to India, Chester Bowles.
He reportedly told Bowles that he could not object to a 
U.S. bombing of the communist sanctuaries in Cambodia. 
Shawcross points out that the declassified portions of 
Bowles' reports do not support this.(145) Sihanouk's 
French aide Charles Meyer later said the intent was for
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small scale attacks, not the large B-52 raids which 
actually took place.
By the time Richard Nixon took office in 1969, over 
40,000 Viet Cong and North Vietnamese troops had sanctuary 
in a 10-15 mile strip just inside Cambodia. The new 
president's attitude toward ending the war rested on his 
experiences in dealing with World War II and Korea, as well 
as his observations of the Johnson administration in 
Vietnam. The Nixon position was that appeasement results 
in a drawn out and expensive war. The administration's 
goal was to operate from a position of military and 
diplomatic strength.
Despite pessimistic reports from nearly all executive 
agencies including the Defense Department, Nixon and 
National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger believed the war 
could end on satisfactory terms if domestic opposition 
could be reduced and if Hanoi and Moscow could be convinced 
of a O.S. will to expand the fighting beyond the 
self-imposed limits of the Johnson administration.(146) 
Since the administration believed that most domestic 
opposition stemmed from the draft, they embarked on a 
program of "Vietnamization" to gradually transfer 
responsibility for the preservation of South Vietnam to the 
South Vietnamese themselves. To convince the communists of 
U.S. willingness to expand the conflict, Nixon and 
Kissinger believed they had to appear to be unpredictable.
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In order to appear unpredictable, Nixon would have to be 
unpredictable and this became the problem.
On his first day in office, Nixon had asked for ideas 
on how to "quarantine" Cambodia and thus cut the enemy's 
supply lines. General Abrams' request followed shortly and 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff argued that bombing and a limited 
invasion were politically more feasible than a quarantine 
because criticism would come after, not during the 
action.(147)
On March 4, 1969, Nixon issued his first threat to the 
communists in an attempt to scare Hanoi and Moscow about 
his unpredictability. Secretly and without contacting 
Congress, he ordered the beginning of what became known as 
"the Menu." Operation Breakfast would consist of 48 B-52 
sorties against the Cambodian sanctuaries beginning March 
18th. Although a handful of sympathetic Congressmen were 
told, the president insisted on absolute secrecy to protect 
the operation. Even Secretary of the Air Force Robert 
Seamans, Air Force Chief of Staff General John Ryan, the 
Cambodian desk officers on General Abrams' intelligence 
staff, and key Congressional committees were not informed 
of the action.
Over the next 14 months, a secret systematic bombing 
of Cambodian sanctuaries took place. Over 3600 B-52 
missions were flown along different sections of the 
Cambodian border in operations known as "Lunch, Snack,
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Dinner, Dessert, and Supper." In order to maintain 
secrecy, the pilots and navigators on the B-52 raids were 
quietly briefed on new targets and told not to report them 
as a "diversion" during debriefing. This way, the crews 
would never know that no one else was aware of the real 
targets.
An elaborate dual reporting system was developed to 
make the strike results "disappear." Ground radar 
operators directing the strikes received secret target 
information with the reporting paperwork already filled 
out. These false reports were then filed with the 
Strategic Air Command's advanced echelon eliminating any 
suspicion by those not directly involved in the bombing.
The original target coordinates would be destroyed in 
classified waste after the strikes were carried out.
Stanley Karnow describes the importance of secrecy to 
the operation. Nixon's goal was to demonstrate U.S. 
resolve to Hanoi and Moscow to force them to the 
negotiating table. By remaining silent, pressure was taken 
off Prince Sihanouk to protest the bombing in order to 
protect his neutrality. Additionally, domestic opposition 
at home would be minimized until peace negotiations were 
already underway.(140) The administration did not carry 
out a simultaneous campaign against North Vietnamese 
targets to protect the Paris talks already ongoing.
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By the fall of 1969, General Abrams and the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff were able to see that the B-52 strikes were 
not accomplishing their objective. Although they were very 
effective at destroying their targets, the bombing raids 
merely forced the enemy farther west into the heart of 
Cambodia. Without a credible defense, local officials now 
were having problems keeping the communists under control. 
By February, 1970, both North and South Vietnamese troops 
were deep inside Cambodia. Cambodia was now calling for, 
but not getting United Nations help in maintaining its 
neutrality. Options seen by the administration included 
heavy artillery attacks, use of South Vietnamese troops 
with or without U.S. air and artillery support, and a 
combined U.S./South Vietnamese ground effort.
At this point, General Abrams asked for permission to 
conduct a ground invasion against the sanctuaries.
Although the president approved limited clandestine 
attacks, he refused to allow an invasion with Sihanouk 
still in power. In hindsight, it is easy to question the 
military utility of such an invasion. Perhaps the General 
was merely trying to cover for past failures.
Other input to the president did not support an 
invasion. Mike Reeves, reporting from Phnom Penh, advised, 
"It would be very risky to try to solve the North 
Vietnamese problem in Cambodia by force. I would consider
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our best action to be to wait on events, saying 
little."(148)
The president's advisors now finally brought up the 
issue of the constitutionality of an invasion into 
Cambodia. Could the president expand the war to another 
country without telling more than a few sympathetic 
Congressmen? Kissinger thought very little of Congress, 
claiming their incompetence in foreign affairs.(149) He 
went so far as to propose a moratorium on all debates about 
the administration's Vietnam policies.
Others close to the president justified action based 
on a "Sihanouk excuse." The Prince's desires to maintain 
neutrality justified secrecy in order to protect him and 
his policy. In effect, support for a leader the president 
did not even like justified secrecy, wiretaps, burning and 
falsification of reports, and concealing the widening of 
the war from the Congress and the people of the United 
States.
The president himself preferred to justify military
action into Cambodia based on his responsibility as
commander-in-chief to protect the lives of the forces under
his command.(150) As he briefed the bi-partisan
Congressional leadership later,
I just want you to know that whether you think it's 
right or wrong, the reason I have decided to do this 
is that I have decided it's the best way to end the 
war and save the lives of our soldiers.(151)
108
One of the barriers keeping President Nixon from 
ordering an invasion of Cambodia was removed on March 18, 
1970, when Prince Sihanouk was ousted by a coup while 
visiting Moscow and Peking. Prime Minister Lon Nol, who 
had historically supported the American position, became 
the leader of the new government. On April 14th, he issued 
an appeal to the United States to help control violence in 
Cambodia and oust the North Vietnamese.(152)
President Nixon decided to support Lon Nol, but was 
tense over reports in the press of secret bombing by U.S. 
forces in Laos. He ordered secret arms shipments to Phnom 
Penh and training of Khmer units in Vietnam who could later 
be launched into Cambodia. Although the Joint Chiefs 
expressed doubts over the success of such a move, they 
told General Abrams to order all captured enemy weapons 
collected and secretly shipped to Phnom Penh.
On April 20, President Nixon announced the withdrawal 
of 150,000 ground troops from Vietnam over the next year. 
Despite his optimism about Vietnam, he stressed, "I shall 
not hesitate to take strong and effective measures" to deal 
with the threat to U.S. forces from enemy escalation in 
Laos and Cambodia.(153)
With increasing communist pressure on Phnom Penh, 
Kissinger and the military leaders called for an invasion 
to protect the administration's policy of Vietnamization. 
They reasoned that if the communist threat was not
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significantly reduced or eliminated, a continued presence 
by U.S. forces in South Vietnam would be necessary. They 
failed to consider that prosecution of a ground campaign 
without the support of Congress would also be damaging to 
Vietnamization.
Unfortunately for the president, the CIA had prepared 
a report on long-term considerations for Cambodia, but 
Director Richard Helms withheld it from him. Perhaps Helms 
did not agree with the conclusions or he thought it was not 
what Nixon wanted to hear. In any case, presentation of 
the report might have been helpful because of its accurate 
prophecy. In "Stocktaking in Indochina: Longer Term 
Prospects," the CIA analysts agree with the president's 
assessment that denying Cambodian sanctuaries was a threat 
to Hanoi's strategy. They also claim Lon Nol was unable to 
do it. Such denial
would require heavy and sustained bombing and large 
numbers of foot soldiers, who could be supplied 
only by the United States and South Vietnam. Such 
an expanded allied effort could seriously handicap 
the communists and raise the cost to them of 
prosecuting the war, but, however successful, it 
probably would not prevent them from continuing the struggle in some form.(154)
It is questionable whether the president or Kissinger would
have accepted these conclusions, but it is interesting to
note how accurate they were.
In a memo to Kissinger on April 22nd, the president
said,
We have really dropped the ball on this one due to the
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fact that we were taken in with the line that by 
helping him (Sihanouk) we would destroy his "neutrality" and give the North Vietnamese an excuse to come in. Over and over again we fail to learn that 
the Communists never need an excuse to come in.(155)
The president authorized final planning for an invasion.
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs General Wheeler called Abrams
to develop the plan. The operation was to begin April 27th
and "Our objective is to make maximum use of ARVN assets so
as to minimize U.S. involvement, and maintain lowest
possible U.S. profile."(156)
Secretary of State Rogers opposed the plan because he
believed an invasion would endanger Vietnamization due to
public outrage at an expansion of the war. The
administration's answer to his opposition was to eliminate
his position in the information loop. Kissinger appeared
to use this tactic quite often in order to quiet the voices
of dissent.
Conflicting reports exist about when the president 
really decided to go ahead with the invasion of Cambodia. 
Sometime between April 26th and April 28th, he made the 
decision and informed Kissinger, H.R. Haldeman, and 
Attorney General John Mitchell, but not the Secretaries of 
State or Defense. Not one Congressional committee was told 
either, despite the fact that the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee had informed Secretary of State Rogers of its 
opposition to substantial aid to Lon Nol. Speculation 
exists that Nixon elected not to tell Congress until the
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invasion was underway because he wanted to reassert his 
power after the Senate rejected Supreme Court nominees 
Clement Haynsworth and G. Harrold Carswell. Nixon claims 
his power to protect American troops as commander-in-chief 
was enough.
The president announced his decision to the country on
television the night of April 30, 1970.
In cooperation with the armed forces of South Vietnam, 
attacks are being launched this week to clean out major enemy sanctuaries on the Cambodian-Vietnam border...This is not an invasion of Cambodia. The 
areas in which these attacks will be launched are 
completely occupied and controlled by North Vietnamese 
forces...Tonight I again warn the North Vietnamese 
that if they continue to escalate the fighting when 
the United States is withdrawing its forces, I shall 
meet my responsibility as Commander in Chief of our 
Armed Forces to take the action I consider necessary 
to defend the security of our American men.(157)
Anticipating the public backlash to come, Nixon
assigned Assistant Attorney General William Rehnquist the
task of writing the legal justification for the invasion.
Citing historical precedent of France in Tunisia, Britain
in Yemen, and Israeli attacks on foreign sanctuaries,
Rehnquist told the New York City Bar Association,
The President's determination to authorize incursion into these Cambodian border areas is precisely the sort of tactical decision traditionally confided to 
the Commander-in-Chief in the conduct of armed 
conflict. From the time of the drafting of the 
Constitution it has been clear that the Commander-in- 
Chief has authority to take prompt action to protect 
American lives in situations involving hostilities... 
President Nixon had an obligation as Commander-in- 
Chief of the country's armed forces to take what 
steps he deemed necessary to assure their safety in 
the field. A decision to cross the Cambodian 
border...to destroy sanctuaries being utilized by
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North Vietnamese in violation of Cambodia's 
neutrality, is wholly consistent with that obligation. It is a decision made during the course 
of an armed conflict already commenced as to how that 
conflict shall be conducted, rather than a 
determination that some new and previously 
unauthorized military venture shall be taken.(158)
Anti-war demonstrations on American college campuses 
became violent. A demonstration at Kent State University 
ended with the deaths of four students fired on by National 
Guard troops called out to restore order.
Reaction in the Congress was equally loud. The day 
after the invasion began, the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee approved a bill to repeal the Tonkin Gulf 
Resolution and charged the president with usurping 
Congressional war powers by not consulting them. On May 
11, the committee approved an amendment to the Foreign 
Military Sales Act restricting future Cambodian 
operations. By the time the bill passed, it said no new 
troops were authorized in Cambodia after June 30, 1970, no 
new advisers were permitted for the Cambodian military, all 
air operations in direct support of Cambodian forces must 
end, and assistance by the United States did not constitute 
a commitment to defend Cambodia.(159)
To justify his failure to consult Congress, President 
Nixon said,
I trust we don't have another situation like Cambodia, 
but I do know that in the modern world there are times 
when the Commander-in-Chief...will have to act 
quickly. I can assure the American people that the
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President is going to bend over backward to consult 
the Senate and consult the House whenever he feels 
that it can be done without jeopardizing the lives of 
American men. But when it is a question of the lives of American men or the attitudes of people in the 
Senate, I am coming down hard on the side of defending 
the lives of American men.(160)
Not all reaction to the invasion was negative. In Great
Britain, The Economist said,
It is not the Americans who have brought the war to 
Cambodia, but the Communists. For years, North 
Vietnam has violated the neutrality of this country- 
with barely a chirp of protest from the rest of the 
world...To condemn the United States for "invading" 
neutral Cambodia is about as rational as to condemn 
Britain for "invading" formerly neutral Holland in 
1944.(161)
By the end of the operation on June 30th, U.S. forces 
captured individual weapons to outfit 74 battalions, enough 
rice for all the enemy forces in South Vietnam for four 
months, 143,000 rockets, mortars and recoilless rifle 
rounds (14 months worth), 199,552 anti-aircraft rounds,
5482 mines, 62,022 grenades, 83,000 lbs. of explosives, 435 
vehicles, and 11,688 bunkers and military structures. 
American casualties in South Vietnam dropped from 93 per 
week prior to the invasion to 51 per week in the six month 
period after June 30th. Clearly, the sanctuaries were 
important to the communist effort, but the U.S. never found 
any evidence of a central headquarters inside Cambodia.
Public disclosure of the B-52 raids did not happen 
until 1973 when military officers involved in the early 
operations contacted members of Congress. New York Times 
Pentagon correspondent William Beecher had asked Defense
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Department officials how to extricate American troops after 
the 1968 elections. He was told "to bomb sanctuaries."
With no indication of such a plan at the time, Beecher 
filed away the idea.
When rumors of the bombing began to surface in April, 
1969, Beecher revisited the same Defense Department 
officials. He reported on Operation Breakfast in the May 
9th New York Times. Interestingly, there was no public 
interest, no press follow-up, and no Senate concern until 
four years later.(162)
The Nixon administration had clearly stretched the 
presidential war power to the limit of what Congress and 
the public would stand for. With similar complaints 
surfacing about Watergate, the time had finally come for 
the Congress to reassert itself.
A good illustration of the expansion of the war power 
over the previous twenty-five years is found in a story 
about the early days of Vietnam. In 1954, French foreign 
minister Georges Bidault asked John Foster Dulles for U.S. 
air support to help save Dien Bien Phu. Dulles answered 
that the president could not authorize even a single air 
strike without Congressional approval. President 
Eisenhower added that he would not make any military 
commitment to Indochina without the agreement of the 
British and French governments and the complete support of
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the Congress. Clearly things had changed by the time the 
Nixon administration was running the war.(163)
A thought provoking story also comes from the Lincoln 
administration. When a subordinate advised the president 
he had the power to invade a neighbor to repel an invasion, 
Lincoln responded, "Study to see if you can fix any limit 
to his power in this respect, after you have given him so 
much as you propose."(164)
In order to reestablish the balance of power with 
respect to war making, the Congress passed The War Powers 
Resolution of 1973. Prior to this act, Congress had only 
been able to control the president through its power of the 
purse as it had done to stop the Cambodian invasion. The 
Supreme Court had remained quiet on the Vietnam war issue, 
so little real restraint was available on the president.
The War Powers Act set down procedures for the 
president to follow when ordering American troops into 
combat situations. President Nixon vetoed the bill as an 
unconstitutional intrusion on presidential authority, but 
the Congress passed the bill over his veto. Subsequent 
presidents have all expressed similar disapproval with the 
law, but have more or less complied with its provisions.
According to the law, the president can only commit 
U.S. forces to combat under three conditions: a declaration 
of war by Congress, specific statutory authorization, or in 
a national emergency created by an attack on the United
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States or its armed forces.(165) In the third instance, 
the president must report immediately to Congress. Unless 
specifically authorized by Congress, the hostilities must 
end within sixty days, and troops must be withdrawn within 
ninety days. After ninety days, the Congress may direct by 
concurrent resolution not subject to veto, the return of 
American troops. The president is also obligated to report 
to Congress before committing troops "in every possible 
instance."
In terms of war making, the power of the president was 
to change. With the instability left in Cambodia after the 
U.S. invasion and withdrawal, the first test of the War 
Powers Resolution would soon come for another president in 
the same part of the world.
CHAPTER VII. FORD-THE MAYAGUEZ INCIDENT
At 2:18pm local time on May 12, 1975, the Delta 
Exploration Company in Jakarta, Indonesia received a mayday 
radio message from the merchant vessel Mayaguez. The 
Mavaguez was a container vessel registered in the United 
States delivering materiel under government contract. The 
mayday call indicated that she had been fired upon and 
boarded by forces of the Cambodian navy. The Mayaguez was 
currently under tow to an unknown port in Cambodia.
The Mayaguez incident is important to the development 
of post-world War II presidential war powers because of the 
background leading up to it and timing of the event in 
relation to feelings about the presidency in the United 
States. As we have seen, the United States had significant 
impact on internal developments in Cambodia up until it 
withdrew its forces from southeast Asia in 1973.
With the fall of Lon Nol's government in April, 1975, 
the Khmer Rouge brought a communist government to power. 
Remembering recent experience with the Americans, they 
began to prod people out of the capital city of Phnom Penh 
stating their belief that U.S. forces would strike again, 
this time in the cities. Although this may sound absurd to 
us, it is helpful to remember the atmosphere in Cambodia at 
the time. Memories of American B-52 raids and the 1970 
invasion were fresh. President Ford and Secretary of State 
Kissinger had made statements at the end of America's
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involvement in Vietnam describing a need to maintain 
American credibility as a military power. Finally, Henry 
Kissinger was remembered as President Nixon's chief 
proponent of acting unpredictably to maintain a position of 
strength. With Kissinger in office, could the United 
States not continue to act in an unpredictable manner? The 
Cambodian communists needed to take the initiative to 
protect themselves from the United States.
At home in the U.S., Gerald Ford had taken office in 
August, 1974 at perhaps the most difficult moment for the 
presidency in American history. His predecessor had 
resigned amidst charges of abusing presidential power. The 
combined stresses of Vietnam and Watergate had demoralized 
the American public and Congress was making every effort to 
assert itself over the president in many areas.
The War Powers Act and the presidential interpretation 
of that law were about to meet their first test. The S.,S. 
Mavaguez belonged to Sea-Land Services, Inc. and was 
enroute to Sattahip, Thailand from Hong Kong with a 
containerized cargo of food, clothing, medical supplies, 
mail and consumer products. Cambodia and Vietnam were 
mounting a full scale naval war against each other over 
several islands in the vicinity of the Mavaauez's route.
When the communists came to power in Cambodia, they 
claimed the seas up to 90 miles off shore as their national 
limit. This claim has more basis in nationalism than in
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international law.(166) These waters included several 
islands in the Gulf of Thailand historically claimed by 
Cambodia. These waters also included several major trade 
routes to and from Asian ports.
Head, Short, and McFarlane cite four incidents prior 
to May 12, 1975 illustrating the seriousness of the 
Cambodian claim.(166) First, Cambodian forces seized and 
released several Thai fishing boats around May 2nd.
Second, the Cambodian navy fired on and attempted to board 
a South Korean ship on May 4th. Third, they seized several 
South Vietnamese small craft on May 6th. Fourth, Cambodia 
detained a Panamanian ship for 36 hours on May 7th. The 
Mavaquez appeared to be the next in a string of seizures.
When Cambodia fell to the Khmer Rouge on April 17th, 
several U.S. made gunboats were captured. These gunboats 
were used by the Cambodian navy to seize the Mavaquez. 
Shortly after 2:00pm on May 12th, Cambodian gunboats fired 
warning shots across the bow of the Mavaquez as it sailed 
abeam the island of Paulo Wai. Captain Charles T. Miller 
brought his engines to idle and ordered the radio operator 
to send a distress call to any station that might be 
listening. The vessel was unarmed and was sailing 
approximately 65 miles off the Cambodian coast.
John Neal of the Delta Exploration Company in Jakarta 
received the message and communicated with the Mavaquez 
until approximately 4:00pm when all communications were
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lost with the ship. At that time, Mr. Neal contacted the 
U.S. embassy in Jakarta.
Initial reports from Indonesia arrived at the National 
Military Command Center near Washington at 5:12am May 12th 
(4:12pm Cambodia time). The commander in chief, Pacific 
(CINCPAC) was ordered to prepare a reconnaissance aircraft 
for launch at approximately 7:00am. The Joint Chiefs of 
Staff ordered the aircraft to launch at 7:30.
The president's deputy assistant for national security 
affairs Lieutenant General Brent Scowcroft received word of 
the seizure about 7:00am and briefed President Ford at his 
daily intelligence briefing at 7:30. Secretary of State 
Kissinger was informed at his 8:00 staff meeting. At 9:23, 
Kissinger arrived at the White House to discuss the matter 
with Scowcroft and the president. President Ford called a 
meeting of the National Security Council for noon.
The first U.S. Navy reconnaissance aircraft to arrive 
on the scene flew over Paulo Wai at 10:28am eastern time. 
The P-3 immediately found a number of vessels within 60 
miles of the island. Two were large enough to be the 
Mavaguez but positive identification was impossible on the 
very dark night, even when using parachute illumination 
flares.
The National Security Council met at noon, 
approximately nine hours after the capture of the ship. In 
attendance were Vice President Nelson Rockefeller,
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Secretary of State Kissinger/ Secretary of Defense Janies
Schlesinger/ CIA Director William Colby, Deputy Secretary
of State Robert Ingersoll, Deputy Secretary of Defense
William Clements, acting chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff General David Jones, Assistant to the President
Donald Rumsfeld, Lieutenant General Scowcroft, and NSC
staffer Richard Smyser. The purpose of the meeting was to
determine the facts in the case, attempt to determine
motives and objectives of the Cambodians, define U.S.
interests and objectives, assess possible third party
interests and discuss U.S. alternatives.(167)
Two reasons have been stated for President Ford to go
directly to a NSC meeting rather than beginning with a
lower level body. First, time was critical. The president
clearly remembered the Korean seizure of the USS Pueblo in
1968 and did not want to allow the Cambodians sufficient
time to transfer the crew to the mainland where their safe
recovery would be much more difficult.(168)
Second, the president felt the need to handle the
crisis himself. The presidency had suffered greatly from
Vietnam and Watergate and American allies were beginning to
question the president's power to effectively handle
foreign policy. A decisive move by President Ford would
help bolster confidence in the presidency.(169) As
President Ford later explained,
First, I think it is the responsibility of the 
president. The American people expect their president
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to act— particularly during crises— to restore matters 
to normal and protect U.S. interests. Perhaps it was 
also a carryover from the evacuations of Saigon and 
Phnom Penh. Certainly in the environment we were in, 
it was essential for the president to be directly 
involved.(167)
The NSC quickly agreed on the two most important 
American objectives: recover the ship and its crew, and 
demonstrate American resolve to act in defense of its right 
to passage on international waters. President Ford 
preferred open discussion among his advisors as the input 
to his decision making. Where Nixon liked written reports, 
Ford liked to be present during the discussion, where he 
could hear and digest dissenting views.
When asked whether his presence stifled discussion, 
the president responded,
I don't believe so, at least not in the way I ran 
the meetings. We had pretty freewheeling discussions. 
I don't think anyone was inhibited because I was 
there. You know, we had some pretty strong personalities there. I did have occasion to act 
in an arbitration role, but I believe this is a 
proper role for the commander in chief.(170)
The president ordered a strong diplomatic protest note
sent to Cambodia through the People's Republic of China,
that the USS Coral Sea be ordered to the area, that an
amphibious task force be assembled in the Philippines, that
continuous photo reconnaissance be conducted over the area,
and that a public statement be made demanding release of
the ship and crew. Agreement was quick. A rescue mission
would be prepared immediately.
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While secretary Schlesinger wanted to limit the action 
to the rescue of the ship and crew, secretary Kissinger 
believed some statement of resolve should be made beyond 
the rescue of the ship and crew. Vice President 
Rockefeller favored the use of B-52 strikes flying out of 
Guam. Kissinger favored a carrier-based strike, but argued 
for a strong military response in any case.(171) Nearly 
all the members favored some sort of military action. 
President Ford agreed that some statement of strength was 
necessary, but that response could be something short of 
B-52 strikes.
Surprisingly, the young man photographing the NSC 
meeting made a suggestion which temporarily made each of 
the members think in silence. He suggested that perhaps 
the seizure of the Mavaguez was not directed by the 
government, but was rather the action of a local Cambodian 
commander. In this case, the amount of retaliation would 
make no difference, because the government would have no 
control over events.(172) After some discussion, 
sufficient evidence was presented to believe the communist 
government of the Khmer Rouge did indeed order and have 
control over the seizure of ships off the coast of 
Cambodia.
Foreign responses began to arrive as diplomatic 
efforts were carried out. A Chinese official told the U.S. 
they would not act in the event the United States chose to
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use military force to recover its vessel. The Thai 
government expressed opposition to military action, but 
President Ford dismissed it as mere rhetoric. He said, 
"Until the Mavaquez and her crew were safe, I didn't give a 
damn about offending their sensibilities."(173)
At 9:16pm eastern time on May 13th, a Navy P-3 made a 
low pass over a large ship anchored near Poulo Wai and read 
the name Mayaguez on the bow and stern. The P-3 also came 
under fire from Cambodian patrol boats, receiving a .50 
caliber hit in its tail. Within the hour, the Mayaguez had 
weighed anchor and appeared to be heading toward Kompong 
Som. Based on speed and heading, the reconnaissance teams 
estimated the time enroute as six hours. Scowcroft 
received this report at 10:15pm and immediately returned to 
the White House to inform the president.
Before meeting the president, Scowcroft questioned the 
military assistant to the secretary Major General John 
Wickham about the ability of aircraft to intercept the 
Mavaquez and prevent its reaching the mainland. At 1:00am, 
General Wickham told General Scowcroft that Thai-based F-4 
fighters could intercept the ship and attempt to turn it by 
strafing its path. Scowcroft ordered them launched and 
asked the president for permission to carry out the 
interdiction. President Ford immediately approved.
A second NSC meeting was held at 10:30am May 13th. 
Counsellors Robert Hartmann and John Marsh were added to
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the list of attendees. Marsh's job was to handle reporting 
of the event to the Congress. Several alternatives were 
discussed during the meeting, but the rapidly changing 
situation did not allow the president to make a final 
decision.
President Ford ordered the USS Hancock to leave the 
Philippines with a Marine amphibious assault unit. He also 
directed deployment of a Marine battalion for a heliborne 
assault and use of F-4, F-lll, and A-7 aircraft to prevent 
the ship from reaching the mainland and to provide close 
air support for any subsequent ground activity. Finally, 
the president directed preparation of a plan to deal with 
the War Powers Resolution.
Consultations with Congress began about 5:30pm on May 
13th in accordance with Section 3 of the War Powers Act. 
During the first of four such sessions, John Marsh and the 
White House staff contacted ten House and eleven Senate 
members and told them of military measures the president 
had ordered.
Early on May 14th, U.S. forces observed a fishing boat 
moving the crew to the island of Koh Tang. General Jones 
told the NSC of five possible military options. They 
included boarding the Mayaguez, landing Marines on Koh 
Tang, bombing the mainland with tactical aircraft, bombing 
the mainland with B-52s out of Guam, and other special
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operations type military measures. The president issued 
four specific orders.
1. The state Department would deliver a letter to the 
UN Secretary General seeking help in securing the 
release of the ship and crew.2. The JCS would plan to attack Tang Island on Wednesday night, May 14, Washington time (the earliest 
possible time after essential forces had arrived.) The 
attack would include simultaneously landings by 
marines from the USS Holt, and naval air attacks 
against mainland targets to prevent Cambodian 
reinforcement of the island or ship.3. B—52 bombers in Guam would be alerted for deployment against the Cambodian mainland if required 
(although the president thought that very unlikely 
and undesirable).
4. Small vessels would not be permitted transit 
between Koh Tang and Kompong Som.(174)
The Joint Chiefs' plan to rescue the ship and crew had
several parts. First, Marines would land on the USS Holt.
They would move alongside the Mayaguez, and take it with a
boarding party. Next, a helicopter assault would be
conducted against Koh Tang using approximately 175 Marines
in two landing zones. Meanwhile, two target complexes on
the mainland would come under air attack. These targets
were the Ream airfield and naval base and the port of
Kompong Som.
Although the JCS hoped to have an extra day of 
preparation in order to increase the odds of success, the 
president and the NSC felt the urgency of early rescue of 
the crew outweighed additional safety factors. The Chiefs 
decided the degree of risk was acceptable, and prepared to 
launch the assault as planned on May 14th.
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At 11:15am on May 14th, John Marsh once again met with 
key members of Congress to inform them that three Cambodian 
patrol craft had been sunk and four others damaged in an 
attempt to keep the Mayaquez from moving.
That afternoon, General Jones briefed the NSC on the 
military plan. The Washington Post reported one 
participant's description of the president's reaction to 
the JCS plan.
He was very calm and deliberate...For some reason, he 
gave me the impression of being a general himself.
The impression I got was of a man who had been in the 
military, and the members of the NSC were obviously 
impressed with his knowledge of the military.
He was the one who pressed all the questions. He 
wasn't going to be rushed into something that would 
fall on his head.(175)
At the conclusion of the meeting, President Ford ordered 
the plan executed.
He then used the same room to brief Congressional 
leaders on his actions. Although the president had 
promised Senator Robert Byrd he would comply with the 
reporting sections of the War Powers Act, he expressed some 
doubt about its applicability to this rescue mission.(176)
A number of members of Congress were unsatisfied with 
the president's attempts to consult with them. Senator 
Mansfield and Representative Holtzman complained that Ford 
failed to consult with Congress before ordering action. He 
merely reported to them once the action was underway.
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Senator Eagleton responded by introducing three 
amendments to the War Powers Act designed to "plug 
loopholes." He also asked the General Accounting Office 
for a complete investigation into the incident. "Such 
reactions," the president thought, "were hopelessly 
naive."(177)
By 8:20pm on May 14, the White House staff had 
contacted most of the Senators who were unable to attend 
the president's briefing. According to a White House 
staffer, about one-half of those contacted merely 
acknowledged the information. Press Secretary Ron Nessen 
claimed the response was "a strong consensus of support and 
no objections."(178)
Military forces deployed in response to presidential 
orders carried out the JCS plan over the next day and 
ceased all operations by 8:15pm on May 15th. Due to the 
short notice and lack of adequate intelligence, the 
operation was costly. The crew and ship were recovered, 
but U.S. forces had 41 killed and 50 wounded. Most of 
these casualties occurred during the amphibious assault on 
Koh Tang.
Domestic reaction to the Mavaguez incident was 
overwhelmingly supportive of the president's actions. 
Congressional reaction was mixed. Opposition rested with 
partisan political objectives and dissatisfaction with
President Ford's attempts to comply with the War Powers 
Act.
According to the president,
In accordance with my desire that the Congress be 
informed on this matter and taking note of Section 
4(a)(1) of the War Powers Resolution, I wish to 
report to you that at about 6:20am, 13 May, pursuant to my instructions to prevent the movement of the 
Mayaguez into a mainland port, U.S. aircraft fired 
warning shots across the bow of the ship and gave 
visual signals to small craft approaching the ship...I directed the United States Armed Forces to isolate 
the island and interdict any movement between the 
ship or the island and the mainland...Our continued 
objective in this operation was the rescue of the 
captured American crew along with the retaking of the 
ship Mayaguez. For that purpose, I ordered late this 
afternoon an assault by United States Marines on the 
island of Koh Tang to search out and rescue such 
Americans as might still be held there...This 
operation was ordered and conducted pursuant to the 
President's constitutional Executive power and his 
authority as Commander-in-Chief of the United States 
Armed Forces.(179)
The General Accounting Office study demanded by 
Senator Eagleton was completed and made public in October, 
1976. The study was critical of the substantive handling 
of the crisis, the decision making process used by the 
president, and itself became a subject of controversy.
The GAO was especially critical of President Ford's 
use of military force to rescue the ship and crew.
According to the GAO's International Division, several 
non-military options were available that were not used. 
Among them were: contacting Phnom Penh directly, contacting 
Cambodian representatives in Paris and Moscow, and
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enlisting the diplomatic assistance of governments other 
than the Chinese.(180)
The administration responded by pointing out that 
Cambodia's diplomatic isolation and unwillingness to 
communicate with anyone precluded all the GAO options 
within the time constraints allowed by the situation. They 
also believed that such efforts were unnecessary since no 
evidence exists to indicate that the diplomatic protest 
lodged with the Chinese failed to make it to Phnom Penh.
As Deputy Under-Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger 
responded,
The drafters of this report had a special 
responsibility to attempt to understand the 
realities of the diplomatic environment at the 
time of the Mayaguez seizure. They did not meet 
this responsibility. Instead, they went out of their 
way to develop wholly fictional diplomatic scenarios 
which bore no resemblance to fact or reality, and then 
criticized the Administration for its "failure" to pursue their fantasies.(181)
The Mayaguez incident illustrates the problems with 
the post-War Powers Resolution relationship between the 
president and the Congress. Real world time constraints 
and threats to American citizens still required timely 
responses by the president. Congress was no more able to 
respond quickly as a coordinated body than they were prior 
to the War Powers Act.
There is little doubt that President Ford failed to 
meet all the conditions outlined in the War Powers Act.
131
He clearly did not consult with the Congress prior to 
ordering military action. The point is that few members 
of Congress seemed to care. They still expected the 
president to act quickly and decisively to protect the 
lives of Americans overseas. Expansion of the president's 
war powers theoretically may have stopped because of the 
War Powers Act and its implied reassertion of Congress' 
war making powers. In reality, expansion of presidential 
war powers probably did slow down or stop because of the 
mere threat that Congress might assert itself through the 
provisions of the War Powers Act. However, when an 
emergency involving American lives was involved, President 
Ford seemed quite willing to risk that threat while 
complying with those provisions of the act that were 
convenient.
Failure of the Congress to pressure the president to 
follow the provisions of the War Powers Act may well 
stem from the fact that few in Congress care about the 
execution of military operations. Domestic issues fulfill 
members' political aspirations much more neatly as they 
serve their constituent districts. The fact that the War 
Powers Act was even passed in the first place does not 
necessarily indicate a renewed interest in defense policy 
by the Congress. It is equally likely that individual 
members of Congress supported the War Powers Act because of 
a popular notion that presidential power had been abused
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and it was time for Congress to act to limit that power. 
Weakening of the presidency by Watergate may be just as 
responsible for the War Powers Act as presidential action 
in the war making arena.
CHAPTER VIII. CARTER-HOSTAGES IN IRAN
The Mayaguez incident indicated that as long as the 
military operation was successful, a president could still 
act swiftly and with resolve in spite of restrictions at 
least symbolicly imposed by the War Powers Resolution. The 
difficulties in planning and executing the Mayaguez rescue 
also illustrated the need for the United States military to 
develop a fast-reaction multiservice counterterrorist 
force. Such a force was developed and trained during 
the late 1970s. The Delta Force was designed from the 
beginning to specialize in counter terrorism using elite 
special forces from all branches of the military. They 
were to be able to quickly plan and execute rescue 
operations anywhere on the globe against the spectrum of 
terrorist threats.
The 1979 revolution in Iran sowed the seeds for the 
first use of the new Delta Force in a counter terrorist 
situation. While the details of that revolution are too 
lengthy to discuss here, it will suffice to say that the 
Iranian situation reached crisis proportions on November 4, 
1979 when revolutionary Iranian students stormed the U.S. 
embassy in Tehran and captured the American personnel 
working there. The hostage-taking was reportedly in 
response to U.S. acceptance of the exiled Shah into the 
United States for medical treatment.
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This case illustrates a situation similar to that 
discussed during the Ford administration, but shows the 
political cost of military failure. It represents yet 
another post-War Powers Act military action directed by 
the president with minimal consultation with the Congress. 
It also shows how the president can minimize opposition 
from Congress by defining the operation as a rescue 
attempt rather than calling it a military action. We 
quickly notice that every presidential military action 
from the War Powers Act through the Reagan administration 
has been in some way defined as a rescue operation.
While this case most closely reflects such an operation, 
others appear to include military activity well beyond 
that required to rescue a group of Americans on foreign 
soil.
The initial American response to the hostage taking on 
November 4th was composed of economic and diplomatic 
actions. President Carter ordered an embargo on Iranian 
oil, a freeze on all Iranian monetary assets in the United 
States, a ban on all pro-Khomeini demonstrations in the 
city of Washington, review of all Iranian visas, 
deportation of illegal Iranian aliens, and the ousting of 
nearly all Iranian diplomats from the United States. The 
U.S. also secured a United Nations Security Council 
resolution calling for the release of the hostages on 
December 4, 1979.
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In addition/ the U.S. petitioned the International 
Court of Justice in The Hague and won its case against Iran 
on December 15th. UN Secretary General Kurt Waldheim began 
his attempts to negotiate for release of the American 
hostages in January/ 1980.
Shortly after November 4th, the president called on 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff for their assessment on the 
potential for a successful rescue operation. General David 
C. Jones, chairman of the Joint Chiefs reported that 
chances of a successful rescue operation were extremely 
small because of a lack of good intelligence information on 
the location of the hostages as well as information about 
local conditions inside Iran. He did, however, promise to 
begin plans for such an operation, in case the need for it 
would arise.
By late December, when the Soviets invaded 
Afghanistan, the military option became more attractive to 
President Carter. The U.S.S.R. had vetoed UN Security 
Council sanctions against Iran and the United States had 
been unable to convince its allies to apply economic 
sanctions without a UN resolution. As the president said 
on December 31,
This action of the Soviets has made a more dramatic 
change in my own opinion of what the Soviets' ultimate 
goals are than anything they've done in the previous 
time I've been in office.(182)
The president was apparently publicly admitting the failure
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of a U.S. policy of quiet diplomacy. He was about to adopt 
a more confrontational approach.
Although a military option had become more attractive, 
the president still had to consider the disadvantages.
With regard to the Soviet Union, the U.S. and Iran had 
mutual security interests in the middle east. Early use of 
the military option would certainly destabilize U.S. 
efforts for a regional security framework.(183)
The new year brought several new developments in the 
hostage crisis. On January 18th, the Special Coordination 
Committee (SCC) of the National Security Council met to 
discuss military deployments to the region and a planned 
set of belligerent public statements designed to keep Iran 
off balance and pressure American allies to adopt sanctions 
against Iran. General Jones reported that conditions for a 
military operation were considerably more favorable than 
they had been in November. The president elected to give 
diplomatic efforts more of a chance to work.
On the 28th of January, former Foreign Minister 
Abulhassan Bani-Sadr was elected president of Iran. He 
would become the prime target of U.S. diplomatic efforts.
On the same day Canada shocked the world by announcing that 
six U.S. embassy personnel had been hiding at the Canadian 
embassy since November and had finally been able to escape
Iran
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Few developments came about over the next two months 
as the U.S. struggled to discuss the hostage issue with a 
disjointed Iranian leadership. Two Farsi-speaking foreign 
service officers with Iranian experience reported to the 
president that a rescue operation at the earliest possible 
moment offered the best chance for a safe return of the 
hostages. Although this report was not well received by 
Secretary of State Vance, the viewpoint it represented was 
becoming more fashionable among the president's advisors as 
diplomatic efforts continued to fail.
By April 1st, the president had finally had enough of 
the frustration. Pierre Salinger reports that President 
Carter determined that the segment of the Iranian 
leadership desiring resolution of the hostage crisis either 
did not have the capability or did not have the political 
courage necessary to secure release of the hostages.(184) 
With signs of even more instability in the Iranian 
government and the Ayatollah Khomeini's frail health, the 
president began to believe reports from Iranian sources 
that a release might take months or even years without a 
military action. Clearly, a policy of restraint was only 
producing failure and humiliation.
The hostage crisis had a crippling effect on all the 
president's other efforts as well. The time had come for 
some sort of action. Although the U.S. did not formally 
break diplomatic ties with Iran until April, planning for a
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rescue operation had been going full speed ahead throughout 
March. The military planning group of the NSC met on March 
11/ where National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski 
suggested a threat of a U.S. naval blockade.
Cyrus Vance opposed a military option, maintaining 
throughout the crisis that a diplomatic solution was the 
only acceptable answer. The Secretary of State claimed the 
U.S. effort should be aimed at downplaying the crisis in 
order to decrease its propaganda value to the Iranians. 
After all, he said, the hostages were not in imminent 
personal danger because of their propaganda value.(185) A 
military raid not only risked the lives of the hostages and 
the participants, but U.S. interests in the Persian Gulf 
would be threatened as well.
On March 2lst, the SCC discussed mining of Iranian 
harbors. Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs 
David Newsom suggested that secret advance warning of a 
naval blockade to Iranian moderates might secure the 
hostages' release without spurring anti-American sentiment 
caused by a surprise action.
The next day, President Carter held a NSC meeting at 
Camp David to discuss the various military options.
General Jones began the meeting with a detailed briefing of 
the rescue option. While intelligence was better than 
before, it was still impossible to know the exact location 
of all the hostages. The general said if a team could make
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it to the embassy wall undetected and all the hostages were 
inside, there was a good chance that all of them could 
successfully be rescued.(186) Brzezinski agreed with 
General Jones that detection during the ingress was a 
rescue team's biggest worry. Any plan would have to be 
able to terminate and withdraw at any time. This would 
make the plan even more difficult.
In the first stage of a rescue operation, men and 
equipment would be secretly prepositioned in the gulf 
region. For the insertion phase, eight RH-53D helicopters 
and eight C-130 aircraft would depart from different 
locations and fly over 500 miles at low level to 
rendezvous at an airfield near Tabas known as "Desert 
One." The helicopters would refuel and pick up supplies 
from the C-I30s. The C-130s would egress the area while 
the helicopters continued on to a remote site in the 
mountains southeast of Tehran to wait for the cover of 
darkness on the second night.
The actual extraction of hostages would take place on 
the second night. Delta team members would enter Tehran on 
local vehicles and storm the embassy. The helicopters 
would make a brief appearance to pick up the team and the 
hostages and fly to an abandoned airfield near Tehran where 
they would meet awaiting transport aircraft and heavy 
fighter air cover. From there, the helicopters would be 
abandoned and the team would fly out on the transports.
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General Jones worried aloud about the complexity of 
the operation. Defense Secretary Harold Brown examined the 
other military options including the mining of harbors and 
a naval blockade. Risks for all the options were similar: 
physical retaliation against the hostages, widespread 
political repercussions, pushing Iran into the Soviet camp, 
and difficulties for American allies. Overall, the 
Secretary liked the rescue option best.(187) However, the 
president decided there would be no rescue attempt unless 
he had no other choice.
General Jones reminded President Carter that the 
rescue mission would become more difficult as the summer 
months approached. The shorter nights would eventually 
require a third night inside Iran in order to operate under 
the cover of darkness.
On April 4th, the U.S. sent a secret message to 
President Bani-Sadr indicating that internal pressures for 
a military operation against Iran were increasing due to 
Iran's failure to keep its promises. The letter called for 
immediate Iranian action or President Carter would be 
forced to take decisive steps and pressure allied 
governments to do the same.(188) The president indicated 
that economic sanctions were only the beginning of "sterner 
measures," and that he was about to make some important 
decisions about the hostage crisis. The Iranian Foreign
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Ministry requested a clarification and was told that no 
more clarifications would be given.
On April 7th, Carter called a meeting of the MSC to 
discuss the Iranian government's refusal to accept the 
hostages from the students. Khomeini had just announced 
that the hostages' fate would not be determined until the 
Iranian parliament had a chance to meet. At the meeting, 
the president ordered diplomatic pressures placed on allies 
to break ties with Iran and U.S. military preparation for 
action including the interruption of Iranian commerce. He 
stated his belief that no further negotiating options were 
available.(188)
By April 8th, the White House staff narrowed down the 
options to two choices. The first option would be one of 
escalating pressure and could include actions like a naval 
blockade and the mining of Iranian harbors. The second 
option was a military rescue attempt. The staff favored 
this option because it would be quick, minimize loss of 
life, puncture the Ayatollah's image of invincibility, and 
avoid an unpredictable escalation.(189)
Brzezinski's note to the president on April 9th pushed 
the rescue attempt idea.
In my view, a carefully planned and boldly executed 
rescue operation represents the only realistic prospect that the hostages-any of them-will be freed 
in the foreseeable future. Our policy of restraint 
has won us well-deserved understanding throughout the 
world, but it has run out. It is the time for us 
to act. Now.(189)
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At a foreign policy breakfast on April 11th, the president 
made one last attempt to discuss mining and blockade 
options. Hamilton Jordan believes he had already made his 
decision when he called for another NSC meeting at 
noon.(190)
The lunch meeting included Vice President Mondale, 
Brzezinski, Jordan, Lloyd Cutler, Secretary of Defense 
Brown, General Jones, and Warren Christopher representing 
the vacationing Secretary of State. Secretary Vance was 
not to hear of the decision to attempt a rescue until his 
return on April 14th.
The president said that although Vance's view that a 
diplomatic solution was the only acceptable one had been 
his own over the course of his presidency, he now felt 
military action was necessary. Harold Brown discussed the 
other military options and concluded that they would not 
free the hostages. In his opinion, the rescue plan 
probably would. In less than an hour, the NSC decided on 
the rescue option. General Jones reported the first 
available date would be April 24th. He was tasked to 
finalize the plan stressing secrecy and surprise over the 
use of large amounts of force.
Hamilton Jordan wrote the president a memo on April 
12th in an effort to support his tough decision. Analyzing 
the situation, Jordan concluded it would be a "long, long 
time" before the hostages came home without military
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assistance. "Once you are satisfied with the soundness of 
the rescue plan, I believe you should proceed with the 
mission."(191)
The Secretary of State returned to Washington on April 
14th and was briefed on the president's decision. He 
approached the president one last time with a list of 
objections. First, a rescue was a difficult option with 
little chance for success. If the operation did succeed, a 
large number of hostages would probably be lost. Even if 
these hostages, escaped from Iran, others could easily be 
taken. Iranian reaction to such a move could cause an 
Islamic holy war declared on the west. A rescue attempt 
would be a deception against our allies because the 
economic sanctions had been sold as being done without 
military force. Finally, such a move could easily push 
Iran closer to the Soviet Union.(192)
Carter offered Vance an opportunity to address the 
NSC, but he still favored the rescue option. The Secretary 
indicated that he was forced to resign, but would wait 
until after the rescue attempt to protect the security of 
the operation. On April 15th, the Secretary of State 
addressed the NSC, but the decision had already been made. 
No one present changed his opinion about the rescue option.
The foreign policy group met secretly with Colonel 
Charlie Beckwith, commander of the Delta Force on April 
16th. Key planners for the operation would be Colonel
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Beckwith, Air Force Major General Philip Gast (Assistant 
for Readiness at Tactical Air Command), and Army Major 
General James Vaught, the task force commander. Beckwith 
was very impressed with the president's sense of 
professionalism. He remembers the president addressing 
General Jones,
David, this is a military operation. You will run it. 
By law you will keep the Secretary of Defense Dr.
Brown informed; and I'd appreciate it if you'd do the 
same for me. I don't want anyone else in this room 
involved.(193)
and to Colonel Beckwith,
I want you, before you leave for Iran, to assemble all 
your force and when you think it's appropriate give 
them a message from me. Tell them that in the event 
this operation fails, for whatever reason, the fault 
will not be theirs, it will be mine.
The second thing is, if any American is killed, 
hostage or Delta Force, and if it is possible, as long 
as it doesn't jeopardize the life of someone else, you 
bring the body back.(194)
The president had ordered what had been his constant
concern, the safety of Americans.
Later, General Jones took Colonel Beckwith for a ride
and questioned him about the "real story" on the rescue
plan. Beckwith assured him that Delta Force was ready and
quite capable of carrying out the rescue. His biggest
concern was entering Iran undetected. As he told Jordan,
The toughest part was getting into Iran undetected. 
They had some pretty sophisticated radar equipment. 
That's why the helicopters were so damn important, 
because we could fly under their radar at treetop 
level. One thing I learned in Nam is that if you 
need one helicopter, you ask for two more, cause they 
get sick real quick. And you gotta remember that
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we're flying in low at night over a long damn distance. Choppers aren't made for that, so me and 
Vaught and Gast all agreed in December that we wouldn't leave Desert One for Tehran unless we had six 
birds. I figured we'd lose one on the way to Iran, 
one going into the compound, and maybe another one at 
the soccer stadium across from the embassy where we 
were going to take the hostages before lifting off. 
That would've given me three, worst case. We could 
have gotten out with three and made it to the desert 
for the flight out.(195)
Army Chief of Staff General Edward Meyer and General 
Jones were concerned about over control of command and 
control elements during the operation based on their 
Vietnam experience. The president understood their concern 
and reassured them that although he had ultimate authority, 
he would not interfere with their planning or execution of 
the rescue.
Early on the evening (Iran time) of April 24th, 
eight helicopters left the USS Nimitz and headed for Iran. 
Approximately two hours after takeoff, the number six 
helicopter developed indications of a possible impending 
blade failure and elected to abort. The helicopter landed 
and was abandoned. The other helicopters picked up the 
crew and continued.
As the flight continued, the formation encountered 
intense dust storms, about which the weather forecasters 
had known but failed to brief the crews. Four hours into 
the mission, the number five helicopter lost essential 
flight instruments. This helicopter reversed course and 
flew two more hours back to the waiting carrier. The crew
146
was unaware the storm would be over in 25 minutes and the 
Desert One weather was clear.
The remaining helicopters arrived at the rendezvous 
point 85 minutes late because of the dust storms. At this 
point, they still had their pre-determined minimum of six 
helicopters, but the crew found a hydraulic failure on the 
number two helicopter shortly after landing.
At just before noon eastern time, the president called 
Jordan into the Oval Office to inform him that two 
helicopters were down and the Secretary of State would be 
resigning after the mission. The president and his staff 
continued their normal schedules waiting for more news from 
Iran.
With the latest hydraulic failure, Colonel Beckwith 
chose to abort the mission. The president was called out 
of a campaign staff meeting at 4:30pm to receive the call. 
With Mondale and Jordan present, President Carter approved 
the abort recommended by Colonel Beckwith. He made no 
mention of attempting to continue with less than six 
helicopters.
While organizing to withdraw, the rescue team 
encountered a number of problems. First was the problem of 
intruding vehicles. A bus with 44 people on board wandered 
into the middle of the refueling operation. The team 
captured the bus and held it temporarily until they were 
ready to leave. A fuel truck and a pick-up also drove into
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the area. The team fired on the fuel truck. Its driver 
stopped and ran to the other truck and escaped. Beckwith 
was not overly concerned because he assumed they had 
surprised smugglers who thought they had been discovered by 
government troops.(196)
Beckwith's more serious problems developed during the 
refueling operation. Maneuvering in blowing dust, one of 
the helicopters collided with a C-130 creating a large 
explosion. Eight crewmen died and five more were wounded. 
The Delta team abandoned the remaining helicopters and 
withdrew on the remaining C-130s. Unfortunately, the team 
was unable to recover the dead in the burning wreckage.
President Carter immediately began to plan for the 
post-mission crisis. His first priority was to convince 
the Iranians that they were not being invaded, but rather 
an attempt to rescue the hostages had failed.(197) He 
would also need to notify Congress, other countries and the 
American people. The president elected to wait to notify 
anyone until the team had safely exited Iranian airspace.
The U.8. immediately sent a secret message to Iran 
explaining the rescue attempt. In a rather bizarre 
message, State Department officials suggested the generous 
aspects of the Koran and indicated the Iranians might take 
the hostages to visit the crash site on their way out after 
release. Five main themes were pursued. First, the 
Islamic revolution had already been successful. Since the
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revolution had been a success, the hostages no longer 
served a useful purpose. Second, the failure of the 
rescue mission showed the justness of their being taken. 
Third, the hostages should be released since we knew the 
Iranians never intended to harm them, but were merely 
expressing their hatred for the American government.
Fourth, the captors were now victorious heroes, and 
finally, a hostage release would show an act of mercy by 
the Ayatollah.(198)
Hamilton Jordan expressed two other concerns.(199) 
First, he felt the aborted mission would be politically 
damaging because a failure would confirm an image of 
ineptness that had surrounded Carter's handling of the 
hostage crisis. Jordan was also worried that the president 
had violated the War Powers Act by not officially informing 
Congress before committing troops to action.
The Ayatollah responded to the State Department 
message quickly, indicating that the hostages would not be 
harmed out of revenge for the rescue attempt. He did, 
however, say that they now had to be dispersed to deter any 
further rescue attempts by the United States.
A number of lessons can be learned from the aborted 
rescue mission in Iran. First, judgment can easily be 
overridden by technology. Two helicopters appear to have 
aborted early despite the fact that they were still 
flyable. The "impending blade failure" indication was a
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fleet-wide problem with no historical basis in fact. The 
complex sensing system on the blades of the RH-53 had never 
before accurately indicated an impending blade failure. 
There is room to second-guess the crew about its decision 
to abort.(200)
The second helicopter aborted for "essential flight 
instruments." While instruments were required for flight 
in the dust storms, landing and waiting out the storm in 
order to fly in the clear was an option. In this case, a 
complete weather forecast might have saved the operation.
The second lesson concerns the president's 
relationship with his military leaders. Although 
considerable criticism was aimed at the president about 
over control, he had made considerable efforts to avoid 
this problem from the beginning. He was painfully aware of 
the command and control problems in Vietnam, and made every 
effort, according to the Joint Chiefs and Colonel Beckwith, 
to avoid repeating those errors. There is no evidence the 
military leaders of the operation felt overridden by their 
commander-in-chief. In fact, when Hamilton Jordan 
interviewed Colonel Beckwith after the mission, he asked 
what Beckwith would have done had he received a message 
from the president to go with five helicopters. The 
colonel told him, "I'd have said, I can't hear you, we're 
coming out."(201)
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Other analysts were not so generous. Paul Ryan,
writing on why the rescue attempt failed, cites a flawed
chain of command and inadequate coordination. He claims
the Joint Chiefs of Staff never got involved in the
detailed planning of the operation and thus, never provided
a necessary "devil's advocate." Ryan writes,
In sum, the actors included a president anxious to 
avoid any semblance of an uncertain procrastinator; 
a pugnacious but militarily unqualified national 
security advisor pressing for covert action to rescue 
the hostages; a cautious secretary of state who 
anticipated trouble if the military rescue went 
forward; a defense secretary whose role in the entire 
affair remains vague; a chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff under pressure to keep the operation small 
and, above all, secret; a distinguished combat general 
expected to organize and train a multiservice force 
for a highly complicated operation to be launched in 
the shortest possible time, but to avoid much killing; 
and last, a highly competent helicopter commander and 
equally distinguished commando officer whose 
recommendation for a minimum of nine helicopters had 
been turned down, a decision that augured ill for 
the mission.(202)
While a good portion of this statement may be true, Ryan 
fails to realize that this situation is not unique. Such 
are the things of which crises are made. Every case 
studied so far provides similar elements. This operation 
just happened to fail.
The president addressed the concern over the War 
Powers Act by reporting to Congress on April 26th. The 
text of his message appears in the appendix. As expected, 
reaction was mixed. While some applauded the president's 
efforts to take charge of the crisis, others condemned him 
for the loss of American lives in the unsuccessful rescue
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attempt. Perhaps surprisingly, little was heard from the 
Congress about failure to consult prior to the operation. 
President Carter successfully described the mission as a 
rescue effort, not a military operation, whose need for 
secrecy outweighed the need for prior consultation. 
Although the political price of failure was high, the 
president's war powers were basically left intact. Once 
again the president had acted before consulting Congress 
and got away with it despite the existence of the War 
Powers Act.
CHAPTER IX. REAGAN-RESCUE IN GRENADA
Ronald Reagan took office in January, 1981 with a 
position that the nation had lost its sense of pride. A 
combination of economic woes and the post-Vietnam/Watergate 
depression had resulted in an embarrassing hostage 
situation in Iran. President Carter's failed attempt at a 
hostage rescue was just one more contributor to a national 
defeatist attitude. With Reagan's flag waving rhetoric 
and emphasis on a strong military establishment, it may be 
surprising that he became the first president since 1973 
to effectively acknowledge the limits on power established 
by the War Powers Act. In fact two fine examples stand 
out during the Reagan presidency to illustrate the 
president's compliance with the War Powers Act. The 
deployment of Marines to Lebanon provides the first case 
where a president consulted with the Congress to determine 
the conditions for deployment.
The invasion of the tiny island nation of Grenada in 
1983 also provides an example of the War Powers Act at 
work. Although it does not "fit" the structure of the law 
as neatly as the Marines in Lebanon, the Grenada invasion 
provides circumstances similar to those found in the 
Iranian hostage rescue, and shows presidential compliance 
with the War Powers Act and a more successful military 
outcome.
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Grenada is a small island nation in the Caribbean with 
a population of approximately 100,000 people. It gained 
its independence from Great Britain on February 7, 1974. 
Although initially democratic, the government of Grenada 
quickly shifted toward a Marxist position. In 1976, a 
coalition of the New Jewel Movement (NJM) and other 
opposition parties won 48% of the vote. The NJM was the 
leading communist party in Grenada.
In March 1979, while Prime Minister Eric Gairy visited 
New York, the NJM carried out a coup with little 
resistance. It named Maurice Bishop Prime Minister on 
March 13th. Bishop and the NJM went about installing a 
Cuban style of government. By 1980, Cuban military 
advisors and construction workers were building an airport 
at Point Salines.
In June, 1982, Bishop banned all opposition 
newspapers. By 1983, he found himself in a power struggle 
with his deputy prime minister Bernard Coard, leader of a 
radical faction of the New Jewel Movement. During the 
summer, the NJM carried out extended debates about Bishop's 
future.
On October 12, 1983, Coard's faction placed Bishop 
under house arrest. On October 14th, he was expelled from 
the NJM. Bishop's supporters freed him on the 19th, but 
People's Revolutionary Army troops loyal to the Central
154
Committee recaptured him and later murdered the former 
prime minister and his close supporters.
The United States had been closely watching 
developments in Grenada since 1979. Hugh O'Shaughnessy 
suggests that the State Department and the Pentagon had 
been secretly contemplating an invasion since Gairy's 
overthrow, but little evidence exists to support that 
theory.(203)
During a speech announcing the Strategic Defense 
Initiative on March 23, 1983, President Reagan publicized 
intelligence reports he had received indicating a military 
nature of the facilities being built at the Point Salines 
airport. After a June 7th meeting between Bishop and 
National Security Advisor William Clark indicated a 
complete denunciation of the U.S., the administration 
became concerned about the safety of Americans in 
Grenada.(204)
When General Hudson Austin, leader of the Grenadian 
army imposed a 24 hour curfew, the president's advisors 
began to worry about the safety of American medical 
students studying at St. George's University Medical 
School. This medical school was actually a Brooklyn-based 
school for students who were unable to gain acceptance to 
medical schools in the United States. With the Iran 
hostages still clearly remembered, the administration badly 
wanted to avoid another Tehran-type capture. The recent
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tragedy concerning U.S. Marines in Beirut also weighed 
heavily on the president's mind.
Eugenia Charles, prime minister of Dominica, informed 
the president of "great risks for us all" in the current 
Grenada situation.(205) The Organization of Eastern 
Caribbean States (OECS) requested American assistance due 
to,
The current anarchic conditions, the serious 
violations of human rights and bloodshed that have occurred and the consequent unprecedented threat to 
the peace and security of the region created by the vacuum of authority in Grenada.
The OECS also pointed out,
That military forces and supplies are likely to be 
shortly introduced to consolidate the position of the 
regime and that the country can be used as a staging 
post for acts of aggression against its members; and 
that the capability of the Grenada armed forces is 
already at a level of sophistication and size far 
beyond the internal needs of the country.(206)
The day after Bishop's death, Secretary of Defense
Weinberger and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
General John Vessey asked the president to approve a
planning effort to design a military rescue operation for
the medical students at St. George's. General Vessey also
recommended turning the battle group of the UBS
Independence and Marine replacements bound for Lebanon to
the south in case they were needed in Grenada. Planning
was complicated by the situation in Lebanon.
At 4:45pm on October 20th, Vice President Bush chaired
a meeting of the Special Situation Group (SSG) of the
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National Security Council. The group discussed the events 
in Grenada and dispersed to collect facts and begin 
planning for potential military action.
At 2:00am on Saturday, October 22nd, Secretary 
Weinberger contacted the president by secure telephone at 
Augusta, Georgia to discuss plans, the OECS request, and 
the short time to collect accurate intelligence.(207)
He urged the president to direct continuation of detailed 
invasion planning.
At 9:00am, the planning group of the NSC met and spoke 
with President Reagan again by secure phone. The president 
approved a landing of Navy SEALS to collect pre-landing 
intelligence, and also the additional goal of restoring 
democracy to Grenada. He returned to Washington at 8:40am 
on Sunday to address the attack on the Marines in Beirut.
A 4:00pm meeting of the NSC planning group was held to 
discuss both Lebanon and Grenada. At this meeting, the 
president directed the go ahead for Operation Urgent Fury. 
The JCS immediately dispatched the rules of engagement to 
CINCLANT Admiral William McDonald. Secretary Weinberger 
authorized General Vessey to use the 82nd Airborne Division 
as a back-up to the Marines already headed for Grenada.
The president immediately decided to notify 
Congressional leaders and some allies before the landing. 
General Vessey advised that Tuesday, October 25th was the 
earliest possible landing time. Reagan approved this time
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and stressed the need for operations security and 
surprise.(208)
While the president had consulted extensively with 
Congress about the deployment of Marines to Lebanon, he 
elected to meet only with the Congressional leadership 
about the Grenada invasion. On Monday evening, October 
24th, the president invited these leaders to the White 
House for a briefing. Secretary Weinberger briefed the 
details of the situation, the risks of the operation, and 
the hopes of the administration for a rescue of American 
students and restoration of a democratic government to 
Grenada. General Vessey briefed the details of the 
military plan with the Joint Chiefs and the National 
Security Council in attendance to answer questions.
Weinberger reports that little comment was made by the 
Congressional leadership. Speaker of the House Tip O'Neill 
reacted to the briefing by commenting, "I can only say, Mr. 
President, God be with you, and good luck to us all."(209) 
No opposition was voiced by anyone present.
Following the meeting, the president called Prime 
Minister Margaret Thatcher in Great Britain, but was unable 
to convince her to support the American invasion. The OECS 
was informed that the U.S. would provide assistance.
By the time all the calls were made, U.S. Rangers were 
airborne headed for Grenada.
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Meanwhile, Sir Paul Scoon, Governor-General of Grenada 
had verbally appealed to Prime Minister Adams of Barbados 
for help from an OECS peacekeeping force. Although his 
letter was sent October 24th, the government of Barbados 
would not release it until after Scoon was rescued by U.S. 
forces.
Dear Prime Minister,
You are aware that there is a vacuum of authority in 
Grenada following the killing of the prime minister 
and the subsequent serious violations of human rights 
and bloodshed. I am, therefore, seriously concerned 
over the lack of internal security in Grenada. 
Consequently I am requesting your help to assist me in stabilizing this grave and dangerous situation. It is my desire that a peace-keeping force should be established in Grenada to facilitate a rapid return to 
peace and tranquility and also a return to democratic 
rule. In this connection I am also seeking assistance 
from the United States, from Jamaica, and from the 
Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States through its 
current chairman, the Hon. Eugenia Charles, in the 
spirit of the treaty establishing that organisation 
to which my country is a signatory.
I have the honour to be (signed)Sir Paul Scoon, Governor-General(210)
Hugh O'Shaughnessy claims that the long time delay in 
gaining release of the letter may indicate it was 
fabricated after the Governor-General was safely aboard the 
USS Guam. Such a situation is unlikely since Prime 
Minister Charles visited Washington just before the U.S. 
landing communicating a very similar message.
In a move drawing criticism from the media, the 
president approved CINCLANT's request that no press or 
other people be allowed transportation to Grenada until the
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beachhead was secure. Because of limited intelligence 
about dangers on the island and a limited amount of 
transportation available, the admiral wanted to delay 
arrival of press teams. The Secretary of Defense supported 
CINCLANT, but stated a goal of allowing the press on the 
island by the end of the first day of the invasion. Actual 
circumstances prevented this until the second day.
Forces for the invasion consisted of the USB Guam 
carrying 20 helicopters under the command of Rear Admiral 
Joseph Metcalf, the USS Saipan with 26 helicopters, and the 
USS Independence carrying 70 aircraft. The 22nd Marine 
Amphibious Unit was aboard the battle group with over 400 
Marines, five M-60 tanks, 13 amphibious armored vehicles, 
and a jeep equipped with anti-aircraft missiles. Their 
mission was to capture the Pearls civil airport and secure 
the capital city of St. George's.
AC-130 aircraft and 500 Rangers were based in 
Barbados, less than an hour's flight away. They were to 
capture and secure the Point Salines airfield. 
Reinforcements would come from the 82nd Airborne out of 
Fort Bragg.
Members of the OECS provided policemen to restore 
order. Jamaica and Barbados also provided small numbers of 
troops, although none saw action in the invasion itself. 
Their role was to guard prisoners and patrol for resistance 
after the U.S. force had taken the island.
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Resistance to the invasion would come primarily from 
the People's Revolutionary Army and local militia units. 
Support from the militia was now almost non-existent, 
however, because of public outrage over the death of 
Maurice Bishop. Over 780 Cuban personnel were also on 
Grenada. Most were involved in building the Point Salines 
airport. While no more than 43 Cubans were designated as 
military, all had the means and rudimentary training to 
defend the field with small arms.(211)
Although U.S. forces encountered small pockets of 
stiff resistance, military goals were met and the island 
was secure by Thursday, October 27th. Order was restored 
and moves toward re-establishment of a democratic 
government were made under OECS supervision. The last 
contingent of U.S. military forces left Grenada on December 
12, 49 days after the invasion began. Free elections 
followed on December 19th.
Deputy Secretary of State Kenneth Dam explained the 
U.S. objectives in Grenada as well as the international 
legal justification for the invasion.(212) Throughout the 
action, America's two basic objectives were to rescue 
American medical students and help Grenada re-establish 
order.
Dam described three legal grounds for the invasion. 
First was the appeal from Governor-General Scoon to the 
OECS to help restore order. "The invitation of lawful
161
governmental authority constitutes a recognized basis under 
international law for foreign states to provide requested 
assistance." There is still considerable room for debate 
here. Just what constitutes "lawful governmental 
authority?" Most would agree this refers to the 
recognized government in power. The trouble is that not 
every nation recognizes the same governments. What 
constitutes lawful authority for one nation might not for 
another.
The second legal justification was the content of the 
1981 OECS treaty. Grenada was a signatory to that treaty 
and requested assistance under its provisions.
Lastly,
U.S. action to secure and evacuate endangered U.S. 
citizens on the island was undertaken in accordance with well-established principles of international 
law regarding the protection of one's nationals.
Although officials of the medical school claimed as late as
October 21st that no danger existed, the freed medical
students told otherwise. According to Weinberger,
chancellor of the school Charles Modica,
secure in Brooklyn, seemed far more concerned with 
whether his school was going to be able to continue to collect tuition fees than he was with the actual conditions on the island itself-or with the very real risk that his students faced, particularly in 
view of the 24 hour curfew that had been imposed.(205)
Despite denying the need, President Reagan complied
with the provisions of the War Powers Resolution.
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Although arguments could be made that he did not consult 
the full Congress prior to initiating hostilities, he did 
consult with the Congressional leadership. In addition, 
his recent consultation with the full Congress over 
deployment of Marines to Beirut caused opponents to trust 
his claim that time was not available for such consultation 
in this case. Security considerations about the rescue of 
the American students also illustrated a need for secrecy 
much the same as that claimed by President Carter in the 
Iran case.
President Reagan did submit a full report to Congress 
following the invasion, and more importantly, withdrew all 
U.S. forces before the end of the sixty day limit. He did 
this despite the fact that after fighting had stopped, the 
administration told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee 
that the War Powers Act no longer applied to Marines on 
Grenada because they were not in combat.(213)
Presidential war powers remained intact and 
indications were that a balance could possibly be struck 
between the war powers of the Congress and those of the 
president. The key to success seems to be good 
communications between the president and Congress.
Because he had gained the trust of the Congress by 
complying with the War Powers Act in the Lebanon 
situation, President Reagan was able to act with less 
consultation in the Grenada invasion. Congress believed
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his claim that secrecy was important to the safety of 
American students on the island because he had left no 
reason for them to believe he wasn't telling the truth. 
His compliance with all other provisions of the act once 
the invasion began lends support to the view that Reagan 
was acting in good faith. Congress seemed more concerned 
with how they were viewed than how they actually 
participated in war making in this case.
CHAPTER X. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
As this study came to a close/ the United States had 
just completed the largest military operation it had 
undertaken since Vietnam. Certainly, a good deal of study 
may now be done about President George Bush's application 
of presidential war powers during Operations Desert Shield 
and Desert Storm. A cursory look at the operations as they 
happened seems to indicate a continuation of compliance 
with the War Powers Act that began under President Reagan. 
Although he claimed no need, the president made significant 
efforts to consult with Congress during the deployment of 
troops and before the beginning of hostilities. President 
Bush went so far as to secure legislation allowing military 
action in the Persian Gulf. No such action had been taken 
since the declaration of war in World War II. Whether he 
would have taken action without Congressional approval is 
open to question. His speeches and historical patterns 
indicate that he would have.
In the post-World War II world, the war powers 
necessarily expanded with the larger role of the United 
States as an economic and political power. The advent of 
nuclear weapons changed military and political 
considerations with regard to foreign policy as well.
Where there had once been definite divisions between 
war and peacetime, now the differences were less clear. 
Advanced delivery vehicles allowed national leaders to
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transition from peace to war in a matter of minutes. Cold 
War tensions led to the development of organizations like 
the Strategic Air Command and an intercontinental submarine 
launched missile force designed to react in minutes to an 
attack on the United States. The United States was now 
prepared for war every day.
President Truman was the first to deal with the 
stresses of world leadership in a world of nuclear power. 
His actions in Korea and a constant concern for escalation 
to World War III brought on the development of the 
undeclared and limited war. No longer would conventional 
military wisdom be able to govern the conduct of war 
fighting. Political considerations had become much more 
important due to the types of weapons available. Alliances 
and membership in the United Nations seemed to downplay the 
role of the Congress in military decision making. The 
president now claimed treaty considerations, the U.S. role 
as a world leader, and fears about nuclear warfare as 
grounds for unrestricted presidential action regarding war 
powers.
President Eisenhower dealt with the aftermath of Korea 
and large numbers of brushfire wars around the world. He 
recognized the importance of a national strategy concerning 
the employment of nuclear weapons directly linked to U.S. 
actions in the foreign policy realm. He also became the 
first president to have to face a potential enemy with a
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nuclear capability. Although Congress paid to implement 
the Eisenhower strategy, it had little role in developing 
it. For the first time, the president led significant 
standing military forces during peacetime. These forces 
provided resources for the president to project power at 
a scale never before imagined.
President Kennedy faced the limitations of a massive 
retaliation strategy and was forced to deal with the first 
real confrontation between the nuclear powers. His actions 
during the Cuban missile crisis show how decision making 
had to be limited to a small group because of real world 
time constraints. Throughout this case, the Congress was 
merely along for the ride. War powers expansion here 
refers to the "imminent danger" concept. While the 
president had always had the power to protect Americans 
and American property from imminent danger, this type of 
danger now existed every day. The details of the Cuban 
Missile Crisis illustrate how very real that danger is 
and was. While the list of presidential powers did not 
grow longer, the actual effect of the president's war 
powers grew much more serious.
President Johnson continued in this pattern of 
increasing presidential control over war making. By 
securing passage of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution he led 
the country into a war of tremendous expense. Without a 
declaration of war, the president now conducted the second
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most expensive war in American history. Vietnam also 
resulted in more U.S. casualties than any other military 
action in history except for the world wars and the civil 
war. A price was also paid by the presidency as an 
institution. For the first time since World War II, the 
Congress began to seriously discuss limiting the 
president's war powers.
President Nixon inherited this dissent and contributed 
to it himself by believing in the existence of strong 
presidential war powers. His decision to expand the 
Vietnam war into Cambodia without consulting Congress 
contributed at least in part to the War Powers Act.
It is possible the Congress was merely striking out at a 
weakened president in the wake of Watergate. In any case, 
Congress had finally acted to reassert itself after 
allowing the president to expand his war powers since World 
War II.
Although expansion of presidential war powers slowed 
or perhaps stopped after 1973, President Ford did not seem 
to allow for much reassertion of power by the Congress.
His handling of the Mayaguez seizure in 1975 reflects a 
general disregard for the provisions of the War Powers Act 
while continuing to commit U.S. forces to action as a sole 
decision maker.
A change in political parties in the White House did 
not reverse this trend. President Carter responded to the
168
Iran hostage crisis much the way President Ford reacted to 
the Mayaguez incident. Although he spent a considerable 
length of time working for a diplomatic solution, the 
president's eventual use of a military option was planned 
and carried out without consulting Congress. Like his 
predecessor, President Carter acknowledged the existence of 
the War Powers Act by reporting to Congress after the fact, 
but failed to meet its provisions for prior consultation.
President Reagan was the first to truly comply with 
the provisions of the War Powers Act. Although his own 
statements and those of his cabinet reflect doubts about 
the constitutionality of the law, he complied with its 
provisions when deploying troops to Lebanon and Grenada.
It is unclear whether limits imposed by the Act really 
controlled Reagan's use of presidential power or if they 
just happened to coincide with what he felt were necessary 
military actions.
Implications for the future suggest hope for a balance 
between presidential and Congressional war powers.
Although I believe it would be foolish to think that a 
president might feel restrained from action because of the 
War Powers Act when handling a real emergency, it is 
realistic to think that the War Powers Act is enough to 
stop military adventuring by the president. The real key 
to the balance of power between the president and the 
Congress will continue to be good communication. As long
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as the members of Congress feel important to the process, 
they seem willing to allow the president considerable 
latitude with regard to war making.
Additionally, it is unlikely the Supreme Court will 
ever rule on the constitutionality of the War Powers Act. 
Its silence on the issue up to now indicates that the real 
issue is the settlement of power division between the 
president and the Congress. Traditionally, the Court has 
left these "political" issues for the people and the 
institutions involved to decide.
Should it feel the need to comment, the Court would 
likely support the president's commander-in-chief power in 
a way similar to its comment on foreign policy in United 
States v. Curtiss-Wriqht Export Corporation (Supreme 
Court of the United States, 1936, 299 U.S. 304, 57 S.Ct. 
216, 81 L.Ed. 255). In that case, Justice Sutherland's 
majority opinion explains and accepts a theory of 
presidential dominance over foreign policy. Since foreign 
policy and war making are often one in the same, it is 
likely the Court would hold up presidential power in all 
but the most extreme circumstances.
In summary, we may conclude that the role of the 
president as the nation's commander-in-chief continued to 
expand in the post-World War II world up until passage of 
the War Powers Act of 1973. Although the president's power 
was not reduced by the legislation, the expansion of his
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power was brought under control by the Congress. Today, 
the president holds more military power than he did in 1945 
because the U.S. position as a world leader and the 
development of nuclear weapons require him to.
APPENDIX
APPENDIX
Following is the text of President Carter's April 2 6, 
1980 communication to the House and Senate, under 
provisions of the War Powers Act of 1973, concerning the 
aborted hostage rescue operation in Iran:
Dear Mr. Speaker:Dear Mr. President:
Because of my desire that Congress be informed on this 
matter and consistent with the reporting provisions of the 
War Powers Resolution of 1973 (Public Law 93-148), I submit 
this report.
On April 24, 1980, elements of the United States Armed 
Forces under my direction commenced the positioning stage 
of a rescue operation which was designed, if the subsequent 
stages had been executed, to effect the rescue of the American hostages who have been held captive in Iran since 
November 4, 1979, in clear violation of international law 
and the norms of civilized conduct among nations. The 
subsequent phases of the operation were not executed. 
Instead, for the reasons described below, all these 
elements were withdrawn from Iran and no hostilities 
occurred.
The sole objective of the operation that actually occurred was to position the rescue team for the subsequent 
effort to withdraw the American hostages. The rescue team was under my overall command and control and required my approval before executing the subsequent phases of the 
operation designed to effect the rescue itself. No such 
approval was requested or given because, as described 
below, the mission was aborted.
Beginning approximately 10:30 AM EST on April 24, six 
U.S. C-130 transport aircraft and eight RH-53 helicopters 
entered Iran airspace. Their crews were not equipped for 
combat. Some of the C-130 aircraft carried a force of approximately 90 members of the rescue team equipped for combat, plus various support personnel.
From approximately 2 to 4 PM EST the six transports 
and six of the eight helicopters landed at a remote desert 
site in Iran approximately 200 miles from Tehran where they
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disembarked the rescue team, commenced refueling operations 
and began to prepare for the subsequent phases.
During the flight to the remote desert site, two of the eight helicopters developed operating difficulties.
One was forced to return to the carrier Nimitz; the second 
was forced to land in the desert, but its crew was taken 
aboard another of the helicopters and proceeded to the landing site. Of the six helicopters which landed at the 
remote desert site, one developed a serious hydraulic 
problem and was unable to continue with the mission. The 
operational plans called for a minimum of six helicopters 
in good operational condition able to proceed from the 
desert site. Eight helicopters had been included in the 
force to provide sufficient redundancy without imposing excessive strains on the refueling and exit requirements of 
the operation. When the number of helicopters available to 
continue dropped to five, it was determined that the operation could not proceed as planned. Therefore, on the 
recommendation of the force commander and my military 
advisers, I decided to cancel the mission and ordered the United States Armed Forces involved to return from Iran.
During the process of withdrawal, one of the 
helicopters accidentally collided with one of the C-130 
aircraft, which was preparing to take off, resulting in the 
death of eight personnel and the injury of several others. 
At this point, the decision was made to load all surviving 
personnel aboard the remaining C-130 aircraft and to abandon the remaining helicopters at the landing site. 
Altogether, the United States Armed Forces remained on the 
ground for a total of approximately three hours. The five remaining aircraft took off about 5:45 PH EST and departed 
from Iran airspace without further incident at about 8:00 
PM EST on April 24. No United States Armed Forces remain 
in Iran.
The remote desert area was selected to conceal this 
phase of the mission from discovery. At no time during the 
temporary presence of United States Armed Forces in Iran did they encounter Iranian forces of any type. We believe, in fact, that no Iranian military forces were in the desert 
area, and that the Iranian forces were unaware of the 
presence of United States Armed Forces until after their 
departure from Iran. As planned, no hostilities occurred 
during this phase of the mission-the only phase that was executed.
At one point during the period in which United States 
Armed Forces elements were on the ground at the desert 
landing site a bus containing forty-four Iranian civilians happened to pass along a nearby road. The bus was stopped
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and then disabled. Its occupants were detained by United 
States Armed Forces until their departure, and then 
released unharmed. One truck closely followed by a second 
vehicle also passed by while United States Armed Forces elements were on the ground. These elements stopped the truck by a shot into its headlights. The driver ran to the 
second vehicle which then escaped across the desert.
Neither of these incidents affected the subsequent decision 
to terminate the mission.
Our rescue team knew, and I knew, that the operation 
was certain to be dangerous. We were all convinced that if 
and when the rescue phase of the operation had been 
commenced, it had an excellent chance of success. They 
were all volunteers; they were all highly trained. I met 
with their leaders before they went on this operation.They knew then what hopes of mine and of all Americans they carried with them. I share with the nation the highest 
respect and appreciation for the ability and bravery of all 
who participated in this mission.
To the families of those who died and who were 
injured, I have expressed the admiration I feel for the 
courage of their loved ones and the sorrow that I feel 
personally for their sacrifice.
The mission on which they were embarked was a humanitarian mission. It was not directed against Iran.
It was not directed against the people of Iran. It caused 
no Iranian casualties.
This operation was ordered and conducted pursuant to 
the President's powers under the Constitution as Chief 
Executive and as Commander-in-Chief of the United States Armed Forces, expressly recognized in Section 8(d)(1) of 
the War Powers Resolution. In carrying out this operation, 
the United States was acting wholly within its right in 
accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, 
to protect and rescue its citizens where the government of the territory in which they are located is unable or unwilling to protect them.
Sincerely, 
JIMMY CARTER
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